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I. Introduction
Is it possible for Congress' interest in a private corporation
to be substantial enough to permit violations of first amendment
freedoms and yet weak enough for that private corporation to
avoid the label "government actor" for fifth amendment
purposes?
In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States
Olympic Committee,' where San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.
("SFAA") was enjoined from using the word "Olympic" in the
promotion of the "Gay Olympic Games," the Supreme Court
demonstrated that it is, indeed, possible. The majority held that
Congress may, without violating the first amendment, grant the
United States Olympic Committee ("USOC"),2 a private corpo-
ration, exclusive use of the word "Olympic" without requiring
the USOC to prove that an unauthorized use is likely to cause
confusion.3 The Court reasoned that the restrictions on expres-
sive speech were merely incidental in light of Congress' substan-
tial interest in encouraging and rewarding the USOC's activi-
ties.4 Congress has, through section 110 of the Amateur Sports
Act,5 properly granted the USOC the right to prohibit certain
* The author would like to thank Roberta Roos for her guidance and support
throughout the writing of this Note.
1. 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987).
2. For a discussion of the Olympic Games, see infra note 41.
3. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2978.
4. Id. at 2981.
5. Amateur Sports Act, 92 Stat. 3048 (1978) (codified at 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-396
(1983)).
Section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act provides:
(a) Without the consent of the [USOC], any person who uses for the purpose
of trade, to induce the sale of any goods or services, or to promote any theatrical
exhibition, athletic performance, or competition-
(1) the symbol of the International Olympic Committee, consisting of 5 interlock-
ing rings;
1
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commercial and promotional uses of the word "Olympic" and
various Olympic symbols.
At the same time that the Court rejected the SFAA's first
amendment claim, it also rejected the SFAA's argument that the
fifth amendment prohibits the USOC from enforcing its rights in
a discriminatory manner. The Court held that the fifth amend-
ment was not applicable because the USOC was not a "govern-
ment actor" and thus, state action was not involved. The facts,
procedural history, and a summary of the majority, concurring,
and dissenting opinions are presented in Part II of this Note.
A discussion of the "state action" doctrine is found in Part
(2) the emblem of the [USOC], consisting of an escutcheon having a blue chief
and vertically extending red and white bars on the base with 5 interlocking rings
displayed on the chief;
(3) any trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or insignia falsely representing asso-
ciation with, or authorization by, the International Olympic Committee or the
[USOC]; or
(4) the words "Olympic", "Olympiad", "Citius Altius Fortius", or any combination
or simulation thereof tending to cause confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or
to falsely suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any Olympic activity;
shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the [USOC] for the remedies provided
in the Act of July 5, 1946 (60 Stat. 427; popularly known as the Trademark Act of
1946) [15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127]. However, any person who actually used the em-
blem in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or the words, or any combination thereof,
in subsection (a)(4) of this section for any lawful purpose prior to September 21,
1950, shall not be prohibited by this section from continuing such lawful use for
the same purpose and for the same goods or services. In addition, any person who
actually used, or whose assignor actually used, any other trademark, trade name,
sign, symbol, or insignia described in subsections (a)(3) and (4) of this section for
any lawful purpose prior to September 21, 1950 shall not be prohibited by this
section from continuing such lawful use for the same purpose and for the same
goods or services.
(b) The [USOC] may authorize contributors and suppliers of goods or services
to use the trade name of the [USOC] as well as any trademark, symbol, insignia,
or emblem of the International Olympic Commitee or of the [USOC] in advertis-
ing that the contributions, goods, or services were donated, supplied, or furnished
to or for the use of, approved, selected, or used by the [USOC] or United States
Olympic or Pan-American team or team members.
(c) The [USOC] shall have the exclusive right to use the name "United States
Olympic Committee"; the symbol described in subsection (a)(1) of this section;
the emblem described in subsection (a)(2) of this section; and the words
"Olympic", "Olympiad", "Citius Altius Fortius" or any combination thereof sub-
ject to the preexisting rights described in subsection (a) of this section.
Amateur Sports Act, 92 Stat. 3048 (1978) (codified at 36 U.S.C. § 380 (1983)). Opinions
and articles discussed in this Note refer to this section as "section 110" or as "section
380." For the sake of clarity, "section 110" will be used throughout this Note, regardless
of the term used by the source cited.
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III. Background information on the "state action" doctrine is
provided, with particular attention paid to the various tests the
Court has used in determining when private conduct is subject
to fifth or fourteenth amendment prohibitions. Part III includes
a discussion of the current trend in these cases and an analysis
of the opinion in terms of "state action" with particular focus on
the strong dissent by Justice Brennan.
Part IV explores the history of first amendment protection
of noncommercial and commercial speech, with special attention
paid to commercial speech both generally and in the context of
trademark law. This Part also includes a discussion of the differ-
ent rationales upon which a claim for trademark infringement
may be based and the resulting first amendment ramifications.
Other cases involving the USOC and section 110 actions are also
to be found in Part IV, which concludes with an analysis of the
Court's opinion regarding the first amendment issue.
Part V concludes that when viewed individually, each of the
Court's holdings in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, although
unfortunate, was not surprising in light of the current trends in
trademark and state action law. Further, although the end result
of each holding is the same, namely deference to the USOC at
the expense of the SFAA's individual liberties, the holdings
when viewed simultaneously are irreconcilable. The Court
should not have found congressional interest in the USOC to be
substantial enough to permit violations of first amendment free-
doms while finding that same interest weak enough for the
USOC to avoid the label "government actor."
II. The Case
A. The Facts
The SFAA is a nonprofit California corporation.' After its
incorporation in 1981, the SFAA began to promote the "Gay
Olympic Games," using those words on its mailings and letter-
heads and in local newspapers. 7 The Games were to be a nine-
6. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct.
2971, 2975 (1987). The SFAA originally tried to incorporate under the name "Golden
Gate Olympic Association," but was told by the California Department of Corporations
that the word "Olympic" could not appear in its corporate title. Id.
7. Id.
1988]
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day event to take place in August 1982, in San Francisco. The
SFAA expected athletes from hundreds of U.S. cities as well as
from foreign cities to participate.' The Games, which were
"designed to combat homophobia and to work for the health and
tolerance of gay and lesbian persons,"9 were to have opened with
a ceremony that was expected to rival that of the traditional
Olympic Games.1"
The SFAA sold T-shirts, buttons, bumper stickers, and
other merchandise bearing the title "Gay Olympic Games" in or-
der to cover the costs of the planned event." In late December
of 1981, the executive director of the USOC wrote to the SFAA
informing it of the existence of section 110 of the Amateur
Sports Act, which granted the USOC the right to prohibit cer-
tain commercial and promotional uses of the word "Olympic, ' 1 2
and requesting that the SFAA immediately terminate the use of
the word "Olympic" in its description of the planned games.13
The SFAA complied with the USOC's request by agreeing to
substitute the word "Athletic" for the word "Olympic," but one
month later, the SFAA started using the term "Olympic"
again. 4 The USOC became aware of the renewed use through a
newspaper article in May 1982.15 As a result, the USOC brought
suit to enjoin the SFAA's use of the word "Olympic." 16
8. Id. The 1982 athletic event was ultimately called "Gay Games I," with 1,300 men
and women from 12 countries, 27 states, and 179 cities participating. The "Gay Games
II" were held in 1986 with approximately 3,400 participants from 17 countries. The 1990
Gay Games are scheduled to take place in Vancouver, B.C. Id. at 2975 n.2.
9. International Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., 789 F.2d
1319, 1320 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting petition for reh'g 2).
10. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2975. Over 2,000 runners were to
have relayed a torch from New York City across the country with the final runner enter-
ing Kezar Stadium in San Francisco and lighting the "Gay Olympic Flame" with the
"Gay Olympic Torch." The opening ceremony was to have ended with uniformed ath-
letes marching into the stadium behind their respective city flags. The competition was
to consist of 18 different events with winners receiving gold, silver, and bronze medals.
Id.
11. Id.
12. For text of section 110, see supra note 5.
13. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2975-76.
14. Id. at 2976.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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B. Lower Court Opinions
The litigation commenced with the filing of a civil action by
the USOC and the International Olympic Committee ("IOC")
against the SFAA and Thomas F. Waddell, its then president, in
the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia on August 9, 1982.17 The USOC brought this action under
section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act to enjoin the SFAA's use
of the term "Olympic" in promoting the "Gay Olympic Games,"
an athletic competition sponsored by the SFAA and scheduled
to commence in San Francisco on August 28, 1982.18 In answer-
ing that complaint, the SFAA counterclaimed for constitutional
violations of its rights to free speech and association and equal
protection of the laws.19 The district court issued a temporary
restraining order followed by a preliminary injunction against
the use of the word "Olympic" by the SFAA. Following further
proceedings, the USOC moved for summary judgment and a
permanent injunction against the SFAA. Asserting that the mat-
ters of state action, likelihood of confusion, fair use in descrip-
tion, the intent of the SFAA in using "Olympic," and the dis-
criminatory and speech-suppressing behavior of the USOC
raised triable disputes of material fact as to both USOC's claim
and the counterclaims, the SFAA opposed the motion.2 ° Never-
theless, summary judgment and a permanent injunction were
awarded to the USOC and the IOC. Attorneys' fees were also
awarded.2
The SFAA appealed the judgment, the injunction, and the
award of attorneys' fees to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, which consolidated the appeals.2 The court of
appeals affirmed the summary judgment and the permanent in-
junction, but reversed and remanded the award of attorneys'
17. International Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 982 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
18. Id.
19. Brief for SFAA, San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987) (No. 86-270) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Supreme Court
Briefs file).
20. Id.
21. International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 735.
22. Id.
1988]
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fees.2"
The court found that the Amateur Sports Act, in granting
the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic," did so without
requiring that the USOC prove that the unauthorized use was
confusing24 and without regard to the defenses25 available to a
defendant sued for a trademark violation under the Lanham
Act, the general federal trademark statute.2
The court did not reach the SFAA's contention that the
USOC violated the equal protection component of the due pro-
cess clause of the fifth amendment by acting in a discriminatory
manner17 in its enforcement of its rights under the Amateur
Sports Act, because it found that the USOC was not a govern-
ment actor and therefore, not bound by the due process clause.28
The court also found that the SFAA's first amendment rights of
commercial speech were not violated by the Amateur Sports Act,
which barred speech without regard to whether it was confus-
ing. 9 It found that the word "Olympic" was essentially property
and that such property rights could be protected without violat-
ing the first amendment.3 0 Thus, the court found that the USOC
was free, under section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act, to pro-
hibit the SFAA from even nonconfusing use of the word
23. Id.
24. Id. at 736. Under the general federal trademark statute, the Trademark Act of
1946 (commonly known as the Lanham Act), the owner of a trademark is protected only
from unauthorized uses that are likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to
deceive. Lanham Act, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 1066 (1982).
25. The relevant defense under the Lanham Act is commonly called the "fair use
defense." See, e.g., S. KANE, TRADEMARK LAW, A PRACTIONER'S GUIDE 172-73 (1987). The
Lanham Act allows "the use of the name, term, or device.., which is descriptive of and
used fairly and in good faith only to describe to users the goods or services of such party,
or their geographic origin." Lanham Act, § 33(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4).
26. International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 736.
27. Id. at 736. The SFAA claimed that the "USOC has discriminated between ho-
mosexual groups and others in determining against whom to enforce its rights in
'Olympic.' It cites numerous other competitive games advertised as 'Olympics' which
have gone unchallenged by USOC." Id.
28. Id. at 736-37. For a discussion of the state action doctrine, see infra notes 84-92
and accompanying text.
29. International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 737.
30. Id. For a discussion of "property" rationales of trademark law, see infra notes
267-300 and accompanying text (explaining the misappropriation and dilution rationales
of trademark law).
[Vol. 8:373
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"Olympic" without violating the SFAA's constitutional rights.3 1
Subsequently, the court of appeals denied the SFAA's peti-
tion for rehearing and rejected the suggestion for an en banc re-
consideration. Three judges dissented from that order and found
that the panel's interpretation of the Act raised serious first
amendment issues.3 2
The SFAA petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
a writ of certiorari.33 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation
decided by the Court of Appeals. 4
C. The Supreme Court
1. The Majority
a. Statutory Interpretation of the Amateur Sports Act
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of
appeals.35 In affirming the court's statutory interpretation, the
majority held that the language and legislative history of section
110 of the Amateur Sports Act clearly indicated Congress' intent
to grant the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" without
regard to whether use of the word tends to cause confusion 6 and
that section 110 does not incorporate the traditional trademark
defenses3 7 available under the Lanham Act.38
31. International Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 737.
32. International Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., 789 F.2d
1319, 1326 (1986).
33. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2976.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. The Court found that the clause "tending to cause confusion" in section
110(a)(4) (synonymous with section 380(a)(4), supra note 5) modified only "any combi-
nation thereof" and was not properly read to apply to the word "Olympic." Id. at 2977.
37. The Court found that the reference in section 110 to Lanham Act remedies did
not incorporate the traditional trademark defenses. Id. at 2978. For a discussion of the
"fair use defense," see supra note 25. Moreover, the USOC already held a trademark in
the word "Olympic" (36 U.S.C. § 380(a)(3)) and the SFAA's interpretation would make
the Amateur Sports Act largely superfluous. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct.
at 2978.
38. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2977-78. The protection granted to
the USOC under the Amateur Sports Act differs from normal trademark protection in
two respects: the USOC need not prove that a contested use is likely to cause confusion
and an unauthorized user does not have available the normal statutory defenses under
the Lanham Act. Id. at 2978.
1988]
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b. First Amendment
The majority then rejected the SFAA's contention that the
word "Olympic" was a generic"9 word which could not gain
trademark protection under the Lanham Act without violating
the first amendment.'0
According to the majority, the word "Olympic" was not a
generic word since the USOC had distinguished the word
through its own efforts,' 1 and Congress could reasonably find
that the word had acquired a "secondary meaning - 'has be-
come distinctive of [the USOC's] goods in commerce.' ",42 There-
fore, Congress' decision to grant the USOC a limited property
right' 3 in the word "Olympic" fell within the scope of trademark
law protections and was thus "certainly within constitutional
bounds.' 4
Rejecting the SFAA's contention that, in this case, section
110 suppresses political speech in violation of the first amend-
39. "A common descriptive name of a product or service is generic. Because a ge-
neric name, by definition, does not distinguish the identity of a particular product, it
cannot be registered as a trademark under the Lanham Act." Id. at 2978 n.7.
40. Id. at 2980.
41. The USOC, together with the IOC, have used the word "Olympic" since the
modern Olympic Games began in 1896. The revival of the ancient Olympic Games was
proposed by Baron Pierre de Coubertin of France to promote international understand-
ing. Id. at 2979 (citing D. CHESTER, THE OLYMPIC GAMES HANDBOOK 13 (1975)). Coubertin
created the IOC, which has established the elaborate rules and procedures for the con-
duct of the modern Olympic Games. Id. (citing Olympic Charter, Rules 26-69 (1985)).
These rules also direct every national committee to protect the use of the Olympic flag,
symbol, flame, and motto from unauthorized use. Id. (citing Olympic Charter, bylaws to
Rules 6 and 53). "Under the IOC Charter, the USOC is the national olympic committee
for the United States with the sole authority to represent the United States at the
Olympic Games." Id. at 2978-80. Formally organized in 1921, the USOC replaced the
informally organized "American Olympic Committee." It received its first corporate
charter in 1950. The Court found that pursuant to its authority, the USOC has used the
Olympic words and symbols extensively to fulfill its object under the Olympic Charter of
" 'ensur[ing] the development and safeguarding of the Olympic Movement and sport.'"
Id. (quoting the Olympic Charter, Rule 24).
42. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2980 (quoting Lanham Act, § 2(f),
15 U.S.C. § 1052(f)).
43. The Court discussed the principle that when a word acquires value "as the result
of organization and expenditure of labor, skill and money" by an entity, that entity con-
stitutionally may obtain a limited property right in the word. Id. at 2979 (citing Interna-
tional News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918)).
44. Id. at 2980.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss2/5
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ment,"I the majority found that by prohibiting the use of the
word "Olympic," neither Congress nor the USOC had prohibited
the SFAA from getting its message across. 6 According to the
SFAA, its use of the word "Olympic" was a political statement
about the status of homosexuals in society."7
Reasoning that any restrictions here on expressive speech
were "incidental to the primary congressional purpose of encour-
aging and rewarding the USOC's activities, ' 4 8 the question was
"whether the incidental restrictions on First Amendment free-
doms are greater than necessary to further a substantial govern-
mental interest. '49 Using this balancing approach, the majority
found that the restrictions of section 110 were not broader than
Congress reasonably could have determined to be necessary to
further its interests in the USOC.5 0
Therefore, under the majority's reasoning, whether section
110 prohibits commercial or noncommercial use of the word
"Olympic," as long as the application of the Amateur Sports Act
is not broader than necessary to protect legitimate congressional
interests, the Amateur Sports Act does not violate the first
amendment."
c. State Action
Finally, the majority rejected the SFAA's fifth amendment
discrimination claim.52 Since the fifth amendment applies only
to government, and not to private individuals or entities, for the
USOC to be in violation of the fifth amendment, it was neces-
sary to establish that its activities or its relationship to govern-
ment were such that it should be subject to the restrictions of
the fifth amendment." This, the majority concluded, the SFAA
45. Political speech is noncommercial or expressive speech which, unlike commercial
speech, does not receive a limited form of first amendment protection. See infra notes
228-230 and accompanying text.
46. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2981.
47. Id. at 2980. See also id. at 2980 n.13.
48. Id. at 2981.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2982.
51. Id. at 2983.
52. Id. at 2986-87.
53. Id. at 2984.
19881
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had failed to prove."' In reaching this conclusion, the majority
found that: the USOC did not perform functions that had been
"traditionally the exclusive prerogative" of the Federal Govern-
ment;55 there was no evidence that the Government coerced or
encouraged the USOC in the enforcement of its exclusive right
to use the word "Olympic"; 5 the granting of USOC's corporate
charter did not render the USOC a government agent;57 and the
Government was not a "joint participant" in the USOC's en-
forcement of its right and there was no proof of a "close nexus"
between the Government and the challenged action of the
USOC.58
2. Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Blackmun joined, con-
curred in part and dissented in part. Justice O'Connor agreed
with the majority's construction of section 110 of the Amateur
Sports Act, as well as with its holding that the statute was
"within constitutional bounds. '59 She dissented, however, to
that part of the majority opinion which held that the USOC was
not a "government actor" for fifth amendment purposes, and
would have reversed the court of appeals' finding of no govern-
ment action and remanded the case for determination of the
SFAA's claim of discriminatory enforcement. Justice O'Connor
believed that the USOC and the U.S. Government were joint
participants in the challenged activity and, as such, subject to
the equal protection provisions of the fifth amendment.6 0
3. Brennan Dissent
Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, stated
in a strong dissent that "[t]he Court wholly fails to appreciate
both the Congressionally created interdependence between the
54. Id. at 2984-87. Since the Court found no government action, it had no need to
address the merits of the SFAA's discriminatory enforcement claim. It noted, however,
that the SFAA's claim was far from compelling. Id. at 2984 n.22.
55. Id. at 2985 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
56. Id. at 2986.
57. Id. at 2985.
58. Id. at 2986 n.29.
59. Id. at 2987 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. Id. at 2987.
[Vol. 8:373
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United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and the United
States, and the significant extent to which § 110 of the Amateur
Sports Act of 1978 infringes on noncommercial speech."'"
a. Fifth Amendment - State Action
Justice Brennan stated two independent reasons why the
challenged action constituted government action.2 He found,
first, that "the USOC perform[ed] important governmental
functions," and second, that there "exist[ed] 'a sufficiently close
nexus between the [Government] and the challenged action' of
the USOC [so] that 'the action of the latter may be fairly
treated as that of the Government itself.' "63
Justice Brennan observed that, in representing the United
States to the world community, the USOC performed a distinc-
tive, traditional governmental function"' which the majority
overlooked. 5 He bolstered his argument with the fact that the
President, in his January 1980 State of the Union address, an-
nounced his opposition to American participation in the 1980
summer Olympic games in Moscow. Shortly thereafter, the
USOC announced that the United States would not participate
in the 1980 Olympic games.6 Justice Brennan found several
other indicia of the USOC's public role, especially its authority
and ability, granted by the Amateur Sports Act, to govern na-
tional amateur athletics related to international competition. 7
The second reason Justice Brennan would have found gov-
ernment action is that the Government "has so far insinuated
itself into a position of interdependence with [the USOC] that it
must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activ-
ity."6 " First, he noted there was a variety of mutual benefits con-
ferred by the relationship. Second, the USOC and the U.S. Gov-
61. Id. at 2987 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
62. Id.
63. Id. (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
64. Id. at 2988. By virtue of 36 U.S.C. §§ 374-375, the USOC is the exclusive repre-
sentative of the United States to the International Olympic Committee. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2989.
67. Id. at 2989-90.
68. Id. at 2991 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)).
1988]
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ernment were closely linked in the public eye in terms of their
decisions. 9 Justice Brennan also found important the close fi-
nancial and legislative links between the USOC's alleged dis-
criminatory exercise of its word-use authority and the financial
success of both the USOC and the U.S. Government, stating: "It
would certainly be 'irony amounting to grave injustice' if, to fi-
nance the team that is to represent the virtues of our political
system, the USOC were free to employ government-created eco-
nomic leverage to prohibit political speech.""0
b. First Amendment
Justice Brennan found the Amateur Sports Act, as inter-
preted by the majority, to be substantially overbroad, violating
the first amendment because it prohibited a substantial amount
of constitutionally protected conduct.71 He found the Amateur
Sports Act overbroad in two respects. First, it granted the USOC
the remedies of a commercial trademark to regulate the use of
the word "Olympic," but failed to incorporate the defenses to
trademark infringement provided in the Lanham Act. 2 Justice
Brennan stressed that these defenses were essential safeguards
which prevented trademark power from infringing upon consti-
tutionally protected speech.73 Second, Justice Brennan found
that section 110(a)(4) as interpreted by the Court, grants the
USOC the authority to prohibit the use of the word "Olympic"
even if the use is noncommercial or expressive.74 Justice Bren-
nan stressed that the overbreadth of the Amateur Sports Act is
magnified in light of the "unfettered" discretion the USOC has
to prohibit other entities from using the word "Olympic," espe-
cially when one considers the large number of such users.7 5 This
69. Id. at 2992.
70. Id. (citing Burton, 365 U.S. at 724).
71. Id. at 2994.
72. Id. at 2994-95.
73. Id. at 2995.
74. Id. Justice Brennan noted that this provision necessarily regulates only noncom-
mercial speech, since every possible commercial use of the word "Olympic" is regulated
by preceding sections of the statute. Id. at 2997 n.30. The Lanham Act applies only to
commercial speech. See § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
75. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2998 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
There are 200 users in the Los Angeles and Manhattan phone directories. Id. at 2998
n.32.
[Vol. 8:373
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wide discretion, creates a potential for abuse which renders sec-
tion 110 overbroad and, hence, unconstitutional on its face.7 6
According to Justice Brennan, the Amateur Sports Act fur-
ther violated the first amendment by restricting speech in a way
that is not content-neutral." Under the first amendment, the
government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, ideas, subject matter, or content. 7 Here, Congress en-
acted a statute which encouraged the USOC to endorse particu-
lar noncommercial messages, 79 while it left to the USOC's unfet-
tered discretion the decision of whether other groups might use
the word "Olympic."80
Even if section 110(a)(4) could be characterized as directly
regulating commercial speech, in Justice Brennan's view, "its in-
cidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are greater
than necessary to further a substantial government interest."81
The USOC's interest in the word "Olympic" could be adequately
protected by rights coextensive with those in the Lanham Act,
since there was no evidence in the record that the USOC's au-
thority under the Lanham Act was insufficient to protect the
USOC from economic harm. 2 Therefore, Justice Brennan would
have allowed the SFAA to use the word "Olympic" in a noncon-
fusing and nonmisleading manner in the noncommercial promo-
tion of a theatrical or athletic event, absent proof of resultant
harm to the USOC.s8
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2999.
78. Id.
79. Id. Congress encouraged the USOC to allow the use of "Olympic" in the "Junior
Olympics," the "Explorer Olympics," and the "Special Olympics." 36 U.S.C. § 374 (13).
80. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2999 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citing United States Olympic Comm. v. Golden Age Olympics, Inc., Opposition No.
62,426 (Patents and Trademarks Comm'n, June 4, 1981) (denial of use of "Olympic" to
senior citizens group); United States Olympic Comm. v. International Fed'n of Body
Builders, 219 U.S.P.Q. 353 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (denial of use to organization promoting body
building)). For a discussion of other cases where the USOC has denied the use of the
word "Olympic" or related emblems, see infra notes 316-333 and accompanying text.
81. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2999 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 3000.
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III. Fifth Amendment - State Action Issue
A. Doctrine
The protection extended to individual rights by the U.S.
Constitution is mainly directed against government action."4
Therefore, some government or "state action"85 is usually re-
quired for there to be a violation of these provisions. "State ac-
tion" questions usually arise in the context of the fourteenth
amendment, 6 although "state action" cases arising under the
fifth amendment are not uncommon. 7
In contrast with that of government, the behavior of private
citizens and corporations is not controlled by the Constitution.
In the Civil Rights Cases, in 1883, the Court held that "[it is
State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individ-
ual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the
[fourteenth] amendment." ' This doctrine has remained undis-
84. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1147 & n.1 (1978). An exception is the
thirteenth amendment, which states that slavery and involuntary servitude are not to
exist within the United States. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (thirteenth
amendment not mere prohibition of state laws establishing or upholding slavery, but
absolute declaration that slavery shall not exist in the United States).
85. Throughout this Note, the terms "state action" and "government action" will be
used synonomously as referring to both the Federal Government and state governments.
86. The fourteenth amendment states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and
immunities of the citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Most of the first ten amendments to the Constitution have
been "incorporated" within the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and
thus made applicable to the states. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 315-16 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter NOWAK].
87. The case which is the subject of this Note arises under the fifth amendment.
The first eight amendments to the Constitution, although they now apply to both the
states and Federal Government, originally applied only to the Federal Government. Bar-
ron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). In addition, the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection guarantee now limits the Federal Government because of
its incorporation within the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). "[The Supreme] Court's approach to Fifth Amendment
equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment." Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2
(1975).
88. 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). The Civil Rights Cases are credited with being the origin
of the state action requirement. See Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote
on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1300 (1982).
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turbed: the Constitution does not prohibit private deprivations
of constitutional rights."0
There are two types of cases that arise under the fifth or
fourteenth amendments.90 First, there are cases involving "offi-
cial" or "formal" governmental action, where the Court is asked
to review some specific act of a branch of government that was
done with formal authority.91 Second, there are the cases where
"official" government action is not involved. In these cases, the
issue is whether a private actor's otherwise private conduct
should be attributable to the government, thus making it "state
action" and subjecting it to the restrictions of the fifth or four-
teenth amendments. 2 This second group of cases, unlike the
first, requires a two-step approach. Before the action can be sub-
jected to review under the amendment, there must be a determi-
nation that state action exists.
B. Historical Background
Until the end of World War II, the state action doctrine was
narrow in scope and most of the Court's state action decisions
dealt with the behavior of "formal governmental actors."9' 3 After
World War II, however, until about 1970, state action underwent
an expansion facilitated by a number of different doctrinal ratio-
nales.9 4 This assortment of doctrines and tests has led to what is
89. W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1514 (5th ed.
1980). The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the Constitution offers no shield
against "private conduct, 'however discriminatory or wrongful.' " Jackson v. Metropoli-
tan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13
(1948)).
90. Discussion of cases arising under the fourteenth amendment applies equally to
cases arising under the fifth amendment, the only difference being the Federal Govern-
ment, rather than the state, is involved in the fifth amendment cases.
91. Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment
"State Action" Requirement, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 221, 228. "This category includes all
legislative acts, executive or agency decisions, or judicial rulings of any level of govern-
ment." Id. at 228 n.26.
92. Id. A "state action" question would arise in this context if an otherwise private
actor was very involved with the state government or perhaps performed a state function
and then, in that capacity, discriminated against another individual.
93. Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern State Action Doctrine, 28 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 683, 685 (1984). It is interesting to note that the doctrine, which underwent
a period of expansion after World War II, has now come full circle and the current scope
is narrow once again. See infra notes 153-196 and accompanying text.
94. Id. at 689-90.
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among the most enduring and often quoted remarks on modern
American constitutional law - Charles Black's description of
state action as a "conceptual disaster area." 95
Within this pattern of confusion, two broad approaches to
state action have existed.' In the first (and dominant) approach,
the Court seeks links between formal governmental organs and
private behavior.97 Theories found in this category include the
symbiotic relationship theory,' 8 the nexus theory," and the
state encouragement theory.100 The second approach focuses not
on the linkage between the government and the private actor,
but on the private actor's concrete activities and their conse-
quences.1"' The public function doctrine falls into this category
of state action theories.
C. Theories
1. Public Function Doctrine
After World War II, the mode of inquiry into the actor's
conduct became more functional than formal. The focus shifted
from the private actor's connections with the political state, to
the specific activities of the private actor and the consequences
of those activities. 02 According to the public function doctrine,
"the actions of seemingly private actors may be inherently gov-
ernmental, and thus subject to constitutional limitations, not-
withstanding the absence of overt state responsibility for the ac-
95. Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term - Forword: "State Action," Equal Pro-
tection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 95 (1967). See also infra
notes 135-145 for a discussion of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715
(1961), where the Court openly admitted that "to fashion and apply a precise formula for
recognition of state responsibility ... is an 'impossible task' which '[tihis court has never
attempted.' . . . Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious
involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance." Burton,
365 U.S. at 722.
96. Phillips, supra note 93, at 690.
97. Id.
98. For a discussion of the symbiotic relationship theory, see infra notes 134-145
and accompanying text.
99. For a discussion of the nexus theory, see infra notes 146-152 and accompanying
text.
100. For a discussion of the state encouragement theory, see infra notes 117-133 and
accompanying text.
101. Phillips, supra note 93, at 690.
102. Id.
[Vol. 8:373
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss2/5
GAY OLYMPICS
tions challenged."1 3
The first appearance of the public function doctrine was
made when the Supreme Court decided Marsh v. Alabama.104
Marsh involved a first amendment challenge to a trespass con-
viction of a Jehovah's Witness for distributing religious litera-
ture on the business block of a company-owned town in violation
of the town owners' rules. 10 5 The town, known as Chickasaw, was
owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation and had all the
characteristics of any other American town. The appellant was
warned that she could not distribute the literature without a
permit and was told that no permit would be issued to her.
When asked to leave the business block and Chickasaw, she de-
clined and was arrested and charged with violating a state law
which made it a crime to enter or remain on the premises of
another after having been warned not to do so.'0 The Court
overturned the conviction and, in subjecting the Gulf Shipbuild-
ing Corporation to first amendment restrictions, the Court used
the term "public function" twice. 107 The Court made it clear
that had title to Chickasaw belonged to a municipal corporation
instead of a private one and had appellant been arrested for vio-
lating a municipal ordinance rather than a private corporation's
rule, the appellant's conviction would have to have been re-
versed.10 8 The Court reasoned that people living in company-
owned towns were free citizens of their state and country, just as
were residents of municipalities, and there was no more reason
to deprive them of the liberties guaranteed by the first and four-
teenth amendments than there was for curtailing these freedoms
with respect to any other citizens."°9
Twenty-two years later, finding "striking similarities" be-
tween the central business district of a company town in Marsh
and a suburban shopping center, the Court, in Amalgamated
103. L. TRIBE, supra note 84, at 1163 (footnote omitted).
104. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
105. Id. at 503. The corporation had posted a notice which read: "This is Private
Property, And Without Written Permission, No Street, or House Vendor, Agent or Solic-
itation of Any Kind Will Be Permitted." Id.
106. Id. at 503-04.
107. Id. at 506-07.
108. Id. at 504.
109. Id. at 508-09.
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Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,110 ap-
plied the public function doctrine of Marsh. This marked a brief
expansionary revival of the public function doctrine."' Logan
Valley involved a first amendment challenge to a state court or-
der enjoining picketing of a labor union within the confines of a
privately owned shopping center because the pickets allegedly
violated a state trespass law. The Supreme Court overturned the
injunction, stating that "[t]he shopping center here is clearly the
functional equivalent of the business district of Chickasaw in-
volved in Marsh.''1 2
The expansive thrust of Logan Valley was short-lived. With
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,'" the Court significantly
narrowed the scope of the public function doctrine. In Jackson,
the petitioner urged that state action was present because the
private utility company, which terminated her electric service
without notice, a hearing, or an opportunity to pay any amounts
found due, provided an essential public service required to be
supplied by state law, and hence, performed a "public func-
tion.""" The Court held that although it had found state action
present in the exercise by a private entity of powers "tradition-
ally exclusively reserved to the state,""' there was no state ac-
tion here. The state law imposed an obligation on the regulated
utility to furnish service, but imposed no such obligation on the
state. Since the furnishing of utility services, the Court held, was
not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state, the ac-
tion taken by the utility was not state action."'
110. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
111. For a discussion of the curr.'nt trend of the public function doctrine, see infra
notes 173-184 and accompanying text; note especially Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S.
551 (1972), which effectively overruled Logan Valley, and Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S.
507 (1976) (where the Court held pickets did not have a first amendment right to enter
the shopping center for the purpose of advertising their strike against their employer).
112. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 318.
113. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
114. Id. at 352.
115. Id, The Court cited the following cases where it had found state action: Nixon
v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (election); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (election);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company town); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296
(1966) (municipal park). Id.
116. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353. It is interesting to note that the Court did not limit
its state action analysis to whether Metropolitan performed a function which was tradi-
tionally exclusively reserved to the state. The Court also utilized the state encourage-
[Vol. 8:373
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2. State Encouragement Theory
Under the state encouragement theory, state action is pre-
mised on governmental enforcement117 or encouragement of pri-
vate decisions.1 8 The leading case in this area is Shelley v.
Kraemer,"" which involved appeals from state court judgments
enjoining black purchasers from occupying property covered by
racially restrictive covenants. The Court held the judicial en-
forcement of racially restrictive covenants forbidding the trans-
fer of a white homeowner's land to nonwhites to be an unconsti-
ment theory, the symbiotic relationship theory, and the nexus theory (for which this case
is most famous) in reaching its conclusion that there was no state action. Applying the
state encouragement theory, the Court rejected the notion that the utility's termination
of services was state action because "the State has specifically authorized and approved
the termination practice." Id. at 354. Metropolitan filed with the Public Utilities Com-
mission a General Tariff, a provision of which stated Metropolitan's right to terminate
service for nonpayment. The Court noted the district court's observation that the sole
connection of the Commission with this regulation was the utility's simple notice filing
with the Commission and the lack of action on the Commission's part to prohibit it. Id.
at 355. The Court explained that the nature of governmental regulation of private utili-
ties is such that the utility may frequently be required by the state regulatory commis-
sion to obtain approval for practices that a business regulated in less detail would be free
to institute without such approval. The Court held that approval by the state utility
commission of such a request from a utility, where the commission has not ordered the
proposed practice, does not transmute the utility's practice into "state action." Id. at
357. For a discussion of state encouragement theory, see infra notes 117-133 and accom-
panying text.
The Jackson Court also failed to see the "symbiotic relationship" between the util-
ity and the state as it found was present in the restaurant's relationship with the state
agency in Burton. It found that the privately owned utility did not lease space from the
state and was alone responsible for the provision of power to its customers. Although the
utility paid taxes to the state and was subject to extensive regulation by the state, it was
similar to the club in Moose Lodge, where the Court said: "However detailed this type of
regulation may be in some particulars, it cannot be said to in any way foster or en-
courage racial discrimination. Nor can it be said to make the State in any realistic sense
a partner or even a joint venturer in the club's enterprise." Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358
(citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1972)). For a discussion of
the symbiotic relationship theory, see infra notes 134-145 and accompanying text.
Finally, the Jackson Court held that the State of Pennsylvania was not sufficiently
connected with respondent-utility's action in terminating petitioner's service so as to
make the utility's conduct attributable to the state for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment. 419 U.S. at 359. For a discussion of the "nexus" theory of state action, see
infra notes 146-152 and accompanying text.
117. See Phillips, supra note 93, at 693.
118. See NoWAK, supra note 86, at 432-37.
119. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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tutional denial of equal protection. 120 The implications of
Shelley were far-reaching 2' since it raised the possibility that
all state enforcement of private activity denying constitutionally
defined rights would be invalid, no matter how unobjectionable
the general rule sanctioning such denials. In a criticism of Shel-
ley, Herbert Wechsler asked: "May not the state employ its law
to vindicate the privacy of property against a trespasser, regard-
less of the grounds of his exclusion, or does it embrace the
owner's reasons for excluding if it buttresses his power by the
law?"'12 2 Although the Court has continued to adhere to the view
that state enforcement of a common-law rule is state action,' 23 it
has rejected an expansive reading of Shelley.12 4
In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 25 Irvis, a Negro guest of a
member of Moose Lodge, was refused service at the club's dining
room and bar solely because of his race. 126 Irvis claimed that be-
cause the Pennsylvania liquor board had issued Moose Lodge a
private club license that authorized the sale of alcoholic bever-
ages on its premises, the refusal of service to him was "state ac-
tion" for the purposes of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 2 7 Irvis sought injunctive relief that would
require the liquor board to revoke Moose Lodge's license so long
as it continued discriminatory practices. 28 The Supreme Court
held the operation of a regulatory scheme enforced by the Penn-
sylvania Liquor Control Board 29 did not sufficiently implicate
the State in the discriminatory guest policies of Moose Lodge to
120. Id. at 20.
121. For a detailed discussion of the Shelley decision and the possibilities it held for
expanding the state action doctrine, see Phillips, supra note 93, at 693-95.
122. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 29-30 (1959).
123. See generally Rowe, The Emerging Threshold Approach to State Action De-
terminations: Trying to Make Sense of Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 69 GEo. L.J. 745
(1981). But cf. Phillips, supra note 93, at 696 n.58 (citations omitted) ("But the Court's
recent emphasis on the idea that the state must be 'responsible' for the behavior chal-
lenged as unconstitutional casts some doubt even on this facet of Shelley.").
124. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1002-03 (11th ed.
1986).
125. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
126. Id. at 165.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. For details of regulatory scheme, see id. at 176.
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make the latter "state action" within the ambit of the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 30 One regulation of
the Liquor Control Board, however, read "[e]very club licensee
shall adhere to all of the provisions of its Constitution and By-
Laws."'' The Court held that although this regulation was neu-
tral in its terms, its application here would result in the invoca-
tion of state sanctions to enforce a concededly discriminatory
private rule. 132 Citing Shelley, the Court held that the applica-
tion of state sanctions to enforce such a rule would violate the
fourteenth amendment; therefore Irvis was entitled to a decree
enjoining the enforcement of that regulation insofar as it re-
quired compliance by Moose Lodge with provisions of its consti-
tution and bylaws containing racially discriminatory pro-
visions."3 '
3. Symbiotic Relationship or Joint Contract Theory
The symbiotic relationship theory focuses on situations in
which the affairs of formally public (government actors) and pri-
vate actors are intertwined in such a way that each benefits from
the relationship.13 4 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority 5
has come to be identified with this rationale even though the
Burton Court explicitly disavowed any unified conceptual ap-
proach to state action questions. 3
Burton concerned a restaurant located in a publicly owned
and operated automobile parking building which refused to
serve the appellant food or drink solely because he was a Ne-
gro. ' The parking building was owned and operated by the
Wilmington Parking Authority (the "Authority"), an agency of
the State of Delaware, and the restaurant was the Authority's
130. Id. at 177.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 178-79.
133. Id. at 179.
134. The term "symbiotic relationship" is Justice Rehnquist's, and is found in his
Moose Lodge opinion. 407 U.S. at 175 (1972). For a discussion of Moose Lodge, see supra
notes 125-133 and accompanying text.
135. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
136. See supra note 95.
137. Burton, 365 U.S. at 716.
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lessee.138
Burton claimed that the restaurant's refusal to serve him
abridged his rights under the fourteenth amendment to the Con-
stitution. The court of chancery concluded that the lease,
whether a "device" or executed in good faith, would not "serve
to insulate the public authority from the force and effect of the
Fourteenth Amendment. '139
The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed, disposing of the
issue on summary judgment, holding that the restaurant was
acting in a "purely private capacity" under its lease and that its
action was not that of the Authority and was not therefore, state
action for fourteenth amendment purposes.1 40 This decision was,
in turn, reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that
Burton's exclusion, under the circumstances, was discriminatory
state action in violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.1 41 The Court acknowledged that the
Civil Rights Cases, established that "'[i]ndividual invasion of
individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [fourteenth]
amendment'... and that private conduct.., does no violence-to
the Equal Protection Clause unless to some significant extent
the State in any of its manifestations has been found to have
become involved in" the private conduct. 14 2 The Burton Court
considered several factors 43 as relevant in the determination of
whether the Authority (and through it, the state) had become
138. Id.
139. Id. at 720 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 150 A.2d 197, 198 (Del.
Ch. 1959)).
140. Id. at 716.
141. Id. at 717.
142. Id. at 722 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883)). For a discus-
sion of the Civil Rights Cases, see supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
143. The Burton Court explicitly considered the following factors as relevant to its
decision: 1) The building in which the restaurant sat was publicly owned and devoted to
public uses; 2) the costs of land acquisition, building construction, and building mainte-
nance were defrayed entirely from city donations, from loans and revenue bonds, and
from the proceeds of commercial rentals and parking services; 3) the commercially leased
areas (e.g., the restaurant area) were physically and financially integral to the state's
plan to operate the garage as a self-sustaining unit; 4) the upkeep and maintenance of
the parking building were payable out of public funds and were the responsibility of the
public agency running the operation; and 5) the relationship between the parking facility
and the restaurant was such as to confer on each a variety of mutual benefits (e.g., res-
taurant guests obtained a place to park and the existence of the restaurant added to the
facility's parking business). Id. at 723-24.
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involved to a significant extent with the discriminating restau-
rant.14 4 Considering these factors, the Court stated:
Addition of all these activities, obligations and responsibili-
ties of the Authority, the benefits mutually conferred, together
with the obvious fact that the restaurant is operated as an inte-
gral part of a public building devoted to a public parking service,
indicates that degree of state participation and involvement [nec-
essary to create state action]." 5
4. The Nexus Theory
The nexus theory, as set forth by Justice Rehnquist in
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.," 46 provides that "the in-
quiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between
the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so
that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the
State itself.""11 7 In Jackson, the Court rejected a due process
challenge to a regulated private utility's termination of electrical
service, having found no state action.'48 The issue in state action
cases under the nexus theory is: How close must the nexus be-
tween the government and the regulated private entity be? The
Jackson Court implied that it must be very close indeed.1 9
What was necessary (and missing) for a finding of state action
was the state commission's ordering'5" the utility's proposed
practice (of terminating services upon nonpayment of bill)
rather than merely approving it.'"' "Jackson's doctrinal innova-
tions make it perhaps the most significant single decision in the
144. Id.
145. Id. at 724.
146. 419 U.S. 345.
147. Id. at 351.
148. See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's analy-
sis of this case under the public function doctrine, the state encouragement theory, and
the symbiotic relationship theory).
149. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358-59.
150. The Court distinguished Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451
(1952), which petitioner relied on heavily and where, following an investigation on its
own motion, the public utilities commission placed its imprimatur on the practices of the
private entity namely the installation of piped in music on buses. Jackson, 419 U.S. at
356-57.
151. Id. at 357.
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Burger Court's state action cutback. '152
D. Trend in State Action Cases
Under the Warren Court, the state action doctrine went
through an expansionary period,163 so much so that the state ac-
tion requirement appeared to be reduced to a mere formality. 154
However, the events of the 1970's and 1980's have proved other-
wise. The effect of the Burger Court cutback on the state action
doctrine has been to limit constitutional challenges to formally
private activity. 15  The trend of the Warren Court has been so
severely reversed that, by 1979, an eminent authority concluded
that state action is "the clearest area of conservatism on the part
of the Burger Court and the most unqualified reversal of posi-
tion from that adhered to by the Burger Court's predecessor. "156
In 1982, with Rendell-Baker v. Kohn15 7 and Blum v. Yaret-
sky, "'58 the Burger Court provided further evidence of its narrow
approach to the state action doctrine. The plaintiffs in Blum
were a class of Medicaid patients challenging decisions by the
nursing homes in which they lived, to discharge or transfer them
without notice or an opportunity for a hearing. 59 In finding no
state action, the Court held that the mere fact that a private
business is subject to state regulation does not convert its action
into that of the state for purposes of the fourteenth amend-
ment.6 0 The Court noted that a state can normally be held re-
sponsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coer-
cive power or has provided such significant encouragement that
152. Phillips, supra note 93, at 704.
153. For a discussion of this doctrinal expansion which lasted through the late
1960's, see supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
154. Phillips, supra note 93, at 700-01.
155. Id. at 701.
156. Schwartz, Olympic Committee and Government Action, N.Y.L.J. Sept. 15,
1987, at 2, col. 1 (citing J. CHOPER, State Action, in CHOPER, KAMISAR & TRIBE, THE
SUPREME CouR. TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1978-1979, at 265 (National Practice Insti-
tute 1979)). This conclusion was based upon the Supreme Court's decisions in Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345 (1974); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1967); and Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149 (1978).
157. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
158. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
159. Id. at 995-96.
160. Id. at 1004.
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the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the state.161 The
Court also held that even though the state subsidized the cost of
the nursing home facilities, paid the patients' expenses, and li-
censed the facilities, the actions of the nursing homes were not
converted into state action. 11 2 Finally, the Court held that the
nursing homes did not perform a function that has been "tradi-
tionally the exclusive prerogative of the State'6 so as to estab-
lish the required nexus between the state and the challenged
action."14
In Rendell-Baker,' 5 a discharged vocational counselor for a
privately operated school brought an action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, claiming she had been discharged by the school in viola-
tion of her first amendment right to free speech and her four-
teenth amendment right to due process. The Court held that the
ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit
under section 1983 is the same question as posed in cases arising
under the fourteenth amendment: Is the alleged infringement of
federal rights fairly attributable to the state?"16 The Court
found no state action when applying the various tests spelled
out in Blum.167 The Court held that the fact that the school re-
ceived ninety percent of its operating budget from public funds
did not make the discharge decisions actions of the state. Fur-
ther, the Court found that the decision to discharge was not
compelled168 or even influenced by any state regulation. Even
though the school performed a public function"" in education,
this did not transform its acts into "state action.' 70 Finally, the
Court found that since the school's fiscal relationship with the
161. Id. See also supra notes 117-133 and accompanying text (discussing state en-
couragement theory).
162. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011.
163. Id. (citing Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353).
164. Id.
165. 457 U.S. 830.
166. Id. at 838.
167. Id. at 839-43. See also supra notes 158-164 (discussing Blum) and notes 102-
152 (discussing the various tests the Court has employed to determine whether state
action is present).
168. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841.
169. For a discussion of the public function doctrine, see supra notes 102-116 and
accompanying text.
170. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842 ("That a private entity performs a function
which serves the public does not make its acts state action.").
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state was no different from that of many contractors performing
services for the state, there was no "symbiotic relationship"1 1'
between the school and the state.172
One way in which the Burger Court achieved this narrowing
of the state action doctrine was by more sharply defining and
more strictly limiting the reach of the public function doc-
trine. "' 3 The Burger Court had begun this process in 1972 with
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,174 where it commenced its reversal of the
effect of Logan Valley. 7 5 In Lloyd, Vietnam War protestors
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against a private shop-
ping mall for its refusal to allow them to distribute handbills in
the mall.176 Vacating a lower court injunction permitting the
handbilling to proceed,7 the Court distinguished Logan Valley
by stating that since the handbilling in Lloyd was not related to
the mall's operations, Logan Valley was not controlling. 7 1
Hudgens v. NLRB 7 9 dealt the final blow to Logan Valley by
declaring that Lloyd had effectively overruled Logan Valley. 8"
Hudgens, like Logan, involved a first amendment challenge by
union picketers against the owner of a shopping center who
threatened the picketers with criminal trespass action.'"' The
Court held that the pickets did not have a first amendment right
to enter the private shopping center for the purpose of advertis-
ing their strike against their employer, a lessee of the shopping
center.' 81
The scope of the public function strand of the state action
171. For a discussion of the symbiotic relationship theory, see supra notes 134-145
and accompanying text.
172. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 843.
173. Phillips, supra note 93, at 701.
174. 407 U.S. 551 (1972). For a discussion of the public function doctrine, see supra
notes 102-116 and accompanying text.
175. 391 U.S. 308 (1968). For a discussion of Logan Valley, see supra notes 110-112
and accompanying text.
176. Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 556.
177. Id. at 570.
178. Id. at 564-66.
179. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
180. Id. at 518. The Burger Court has rendered other Warren Court state action
decisions virtually useless without actually overruling them. Schwartz, supra note 156, at
2, col. 2.
181. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 508.
182. Id. at 520-21.
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doctrine was narrowed further still with the Burger Court's
holding in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,183 which limited
its reach to exercises by private entities of powers "traditionally
exclusively reserved to the state.'" 4 Jackson also contributed to
the Burger Court cutback on the other strands'85 of the state
action doctrine.'8 6
With Jackson, the Court implicitly rejected the symbiotic
relationship doctrine formulated in Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Authority, 8 7 by ignoring Burton's teaching that distinct in-
dicia of, or rationales for, state action can be assessed in their
aggregate or cumulative impact.188
The Burger Court also cast some doubt, in the Jackson
opinion, as to the continued vitality of the state encouragement
strand8 " of the state action doctrine analysis by holding that
approval by the state of the utility's termination practice was
"no more than a determination that a Pennsylvania utility was
authorized to employ such a practice if it so desired."' 0 How-
ever, it was not until Flagg Bros. v. Brooks"' that this strand of
state action analysis was virtually eliminated. 92
183. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
184. Id. at 352. See also Schwartz, supra note 156, at 2, col. 2 ("The [Burger] Court
• . . has rendered the public function doctrine virtually useless by requiring that the
functions have been 'traditionally the exclusive prerogative' of government.") (emphasis
in original).
185. Reference to "strands" here means the tests or theories the Court has used in
order to determine the existence of state action; see supra notes 102-152 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the various tests).
186. Jackson has been called the most significant singular decision in the Burger
Court's state action cutback. See Phillips, supra note 93, at 704 (discussing Jackson's
doctrinal innovations).
187. 365 U.S. 715.
188. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 362-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Though the Court pays
lip service to the need for assessing the totality of the State's involvement in this enter-
prise .... its underlying analysis is fundamentally sequential rather than cumulative.").
See also Schwartz, supra note 156 ("The Court has given the symbiotic relationship doc-
trine formulated in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth. a niggardly interpretation.")
(citing Blum, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Jackson, 419 U.S.
345 (1974); Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)).
189. For a discussion of the "state encouragement" theory, see supra notes 117-133
and accompanying text.
190. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357.
191. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
192. Phillips, supra note 93, at 705-06.
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In Flagg Bros.,193 the Court rejected a due process challenge
to a warehouseman's threat to sell personal property pursuant to
a New York Uniform Commercial Code provision, which allowed
such a sale in order to satisfy unpaid storage charges.194 The
Court rejected the claim that the defendant's action was author-
ized and encouraged by the permissive UCC provision and
stated that "[tihis Court, however, has never held that a state's
mere acquiescence in a private action converts that action into
that of the State."19 The Court held that in order for the state
to be responsible for the act of a private party, the state must,
by its law, compel that act."' a
E. Application to San Francisco Arts & Athletics
Given the current trend,197 the San Francisco Arts & Ath-
letics Court's determination that the USOC's enforcement of its
exclusive right to use the word "Olympic""" 8 did not constitute
government action under the fifth amendment 99  is not
surprising. °0
193. 436 U.S. 149. This case, Jackson, and Moose Lodge comprise what is called the
"Rehnquist Trilogy," the trio of cases that cemented the Court's new direction. Phillips,
supra note 93, at 703.
194. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 166.
195. Id. at 164.
196. Id. at 164-65.
197. For a discussion of the Burger Court's narrow approach in state action cases,
see supra notes 155-196 and accompanying text.
198. See 36 U.S.C. § 380, reproduced supra note 5.
199. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. 2971, 2984-87 (1987).
200. This is only the third case in which the USOC has been challenged as being a
"government actor." In DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181
(1980), the court held that the decision of the USOC not to send an American team to
the summer Olympics was not state action. Id. at 1194. In reaching this conclusion, the
court, distinguishing Burton, found that the Federal Government and the USOC did not
enjoy a "symbiotic relationship" (e.g., the USOC had, at that time, received no federal
funding even though funding was authorized under the Amateur Sports Act). Id. at 1193.
In fact, the only link the court found was that the Amateur Sports Act required the
USOC to submit an annual report to the President and Congress, which "hardly con-
vert[ed] such an independent relationship to a 'joint participation.' " Id. The court also
rejected the athletes' argument that the "campaign of governmental persuasion, person-
ally led by President Carter, crossed the line from 'governmental recommendation,' ...
into the area of 'affirmative pressure,'" thus creating a " 'sufficiently close nexus between
the [government] and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of
the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself.'" Id. (quoting Jackson v. Met-
ropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1947)). Furthermore, the court also found that
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Under the current restrictive definition of public function 0 1
which renders the doctrine virtually meaningless,' 20 it seemed a
simple matter for the majority to find that, while the USOC per-
formed important governmental functions in the national inter-
est, "[n]either the conduct nor the coordination of amateur
sports has been a traditional governmental function."203 How-
ever, as Justice Brennan observed in his dissent, the USOC per-
forms a distinctive, traditional governmental function in that it
"represents this Nation to the world community." 0'
National representation is not the USOC's only public func-
tion. Congress' dissatisfaction with the performance of the
United States in international athletic competitions led it to
grant the USOC an unprecedented administrative authority over
all private American athletic organizations involved in interna-,
tional competition.2
Thus, unlike the nursing home in Blum,2 06 or the private
even if the vote of the USOC had constituted state action, the athletes had no constitu-
tionally protected right to compete in amateur athletics. DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1194.
Therefore the precedential value of this case for purposes here is minimal at best.
The second case involving the USOC and a claim of state action, Martin v. Interna-
tional Olympic Comm., 740 F.2d 670 (1984), also offers little guidance. Although women
runners in Martin were ultimately unsuccessful, their claim that the lack of equal medal
opportunities for women in the 1984 Olympic Games violated their equal protection
rights under the fifth amendment was found to involve a constitutionally protected right.
Id. at 677. Cf. DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. 1181. However, Martin, like DeFrantz, is of little
precedential value as to the issue of what constitutes state action because, in affirming
the district court's finding of state action, the court's entire discussion was as follows:
"[W]e cannot say, on this record, that the district court erroneously found state action
present." Martin, 740 F.2d at 677.
201. See supra notes 173-184 and accompanying text (discussing the Burger Court
cutback on the public function doctrine).
202. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2988 n.1 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (limiting the doctrine to "exclusive" governmental functions has the undesirable
consequence of "freezing into law a static conception of Government and our judicial
theory of government action would cease to resemble contemporary experience").
203. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2985.
204. Id. at 2988 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority's weak argument in rejecting
this contention was that the USOC's representational function could not be said to be
traditionally and exclusively governmental because "[aIll sorts of private organizations
send 'national representatives' to participate in world competitions." San Francisco Arts
& Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2985 n.27.
205. Id. at 2990 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "The legislative history reveals ... that no
actor in the private sector had ever performed this function, and indeed never could
perform it absent enabling legislation." Id.
206. 457 U.S. 991.
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school in Rendell-Baker,07  or the private club in Moose
Lodge,20 8 or even the public utility in Jackson,209 the USOC does
not merely provide a public service.21 0 It "has been endowed by
the Federal Government with the exclusive power to serve a
unique, national, administrative, adjudicative, and representa-
tional role." 21'
Since the state encouragement strand of the state action
doctrine has been virtually eliminated, 2 the majority's finding
of no state action under this test was very predictable. 213 It is
equally unsurprising that the Court found the Federal Govern-
ment's various involvements with the USOC were insufficient to
render its allegedly discriminatory enforcement government
action.21
207. 457 U.S. 830.
208. 407 U.S. 163.
209. 419 U.S. 345.
210. 107 S. Ct. at 2991 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
211. Id. Justice Brennan noted that these attributes also distinguish the USOC from
most of the "69 other federally created private corporations such as the American Le-
gion, Big Brothers-Big Sisters of America, Daughters of the American Revolution, Veter-
ans of Foreign Wars of the United States, whose presumed status as private actors is not
threatened by a finding of government action here." Id. at 2991 n.11 (citation omitted).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 189-196 (discussing the impact of Jackson,
419 U.S. 345, and Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. 149, on this doctrine). In order to find state
action under this strand, the "private" decision must have been coerced or significantly
encouraged by the government. See supra text accompanying notes 117-118.
213. The Court stated that "[alt most, the Federal Government, by failing to super-
vise the USOC's use of its rights, can be said to exercise '[m]ere approval of or acquies-
cence in the initiatives' of the USOC. This is not enough to make the USOC's actions
those of the Government." San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2986 (citations
omitted).
It is interesting to note in discussing the state encouragement strand in this case,
the SFAA, relying on Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, argued that the district court's
grant of injunctive relief in favor of the USOC constituted government action. San Fran-
cisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2987 n.30. However, the San Francisco Arts &
Athletics Court sidestepped the question altogether because, although the petition for
certiorari argued that the USOC was a state actor, it did not raise the issue of whether
the district court's grant of injunctive relief constituted government action, and this
question was not "fairly encompassed" within the questions presented. Id. See also
Schwartz, supra note 156, at 3, cols. 1-2 (discussing the Court's avoidance of the Shelley
issue).
214. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2985. The fact that Congress
granted USOC a corporate charter was insufficient because all corporations are chartered
by government and "[tlhey do not thereby lose their essentially private character." Id.
The fact that the USOC was subject to federal regulation was insufficient because even
extensive governmental regulation was an insufficient basis for finding state action. Id.
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However, the Court, by considering each facet of govern-
ment action separately, failed to look at the whole picture.21 5
When one looks at the whole picture, it becomes clear that the
USOC and the Federal Government "[e]xist[ed] in a symbiotic
relationship sufficient to provide a nexus between the USOC's
challenged action and the Government."2 16 This relationship
provided a variety of mutual benefits, as did the relationship in
Burton."1 7
The Amateur Sports Act conferred upon the USOC author-
ity and responsibilities never before held by a private organiza-
tion in this country,2 18 substantial financial resources,1 9 and the
power to raise additional funds through the exclusive use of the
word "Olympic" and related emblems.220 In return, the U.S.
Government obtained an effective organization to coordinate all
amateur athletics related to international competition. 22' Fur-
ther, there was a strong connection between the USOC and the
U.S. Government in the eyes of the public both here and
abroad.222
There was also a close financial and legislative link between
the USOC's alleged discriminatory exercise of its word-use au-
thority and the financial success of both the USOC and the Gov-
ernment. Given that the purpose of this grant of unique discre-
See, e.g., Blum, 457 U.S. 991; Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. 830; Jackson, 419 U.S. 345. The
fact that Congress granted the USOC a "trademark plus" in the word Olympic, even
though designed to help the USOC obtain funding, did not warrant a finding of govern-
ment action because governments "may subsidize private entities without assuming con-
stitutional responsibility for their actions." San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at
2985.
215. Schwartz, supra note 156. "When one analyzes all of the involvement with gov-
ernment what emerges is a governmentally created entity that is regulated, receives spe-
cial benefits and performs a critical representational function. In short, it shows an en-
tity that is fairly akin to a governmental agency." Id. at 2, col. 4. See also Burton, 365
U.S. 715 (holding that distinct indicia of state action should be assessed in their aggre-
gate or cumulative impact). But see supra notes 187-188 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Jackson Court's implicit rejection of Burton's teaching).
216. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2991-92 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 2992.
218. Id.
219. The USOC was authorized to seek up to $16 million annually in grants from
the Secretary of Commerce. 36 U.S.C. § 384(a).
220. 36 U.S.C. § 380.
221. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2992 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 2992 (citing Burton, 365 U.S. at 724).
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tion was to enhance the fundraising ability of the USOC,"2 and
that the USOC has used this discretion to discriminate against
the SFAA, then here, as in Burton, "profits earned by discrimi-
nation not only contribute to, but also are indispensable ele-
ments in, the financial success of a governmental agency. '224
Finally, the issue of state action deserved more sensitive
handling than that afforded by the Court, especially when the
entity challenged as a state actor was engaged in what the chal-
lenger claims to be invidious discrimination.225
IV. First Amendment Issue
A. Protected Speech
The first amendment states: "Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... 26
There are two types of speech protected by this clause, noncom-
mercial speech and, to a lesser extent, commercial speech.227
1. Noncommercial Speech
Noncommercial or expressive speech is any speech which
does not advertise a service or product for profit or for a busi-
ness purpose.22 8 An important subcategory of noncommercial
speech is political speech.229 Although there are various interpre-
223. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2981-82.
224. Burton, 365 U.S. at 724.
225. The second circuit has explicitly stated that its state action tests will differ
depending on the nature of the substantive claim advanced. See, e.g., Taylor v. Consoli-
dated Edison Co., 552 F.2d 39, 42-43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 845 (1977) (lesser
degree of governmental involvement needed to find state action in racial discrimination
case than in due process or first amendment case; sexual discrimination cases also re-
quire (unspecified) lesser degree of governmental involvement). See also Fortin v. Dar-
lington Little League, 514 F.2d 344, 347-48 (1st Cir. 1975) (Little League, chartered by
Congress, held to be engaged in state action when it used public resources to provide
softball games for boys only).
226. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
227. G. GUNTHER, supra note 124, at 972.
228. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 923 (2d ed. 1983).
See also infra note 231 (defining commercial speech).
229. "Political speech" is speech that participates in the process of representative
democracy and does not advocate violent overthrow of the government or incite unlawful
acts. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Sub-
stance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 300 (1978). Although many first
amendment theorists admit that the speech clause bears an essential relationship to the
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tations of the first amendment language, political speech, by
wide agreement, is the type of speech that most clearly comes
within the protection of the first amendment. 3 0
2. Commercial Speech
a. General Commercial Speech
The extent to which commercial speech23 is protected by
the first amendment is not quite so clear. What is clear is that
the extent of protection afforded commercial speech is less than
that which noncommercial speech receives. 23 1 In fact, until re-
cently,23 3 restrictions on commercial speech were thought to be
exempt from first amendment prohibitions.234
The judicial approach to commercial speech was first set
forth in 1942 in Valentine v. Chrestensen235 where the Supreme
democratic political process, there is no such wide acceptance that protection is limited
to political speech. Judge Bork, arguing on behalf of such a limitation, has acknowledged
that his belief in the political speech principle "departs drastically from existing Court-
made law." Id. at 302 (citing Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971)).
230. G. GUNTHER, supra note 124, at 972. This is consistent with the three major
justifications advanced by Justice Louis Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), to support the fundamental right to freedom of speech as
it is embodied in the first amendment. First, freedom of speech is an essential require-
ment for democratic self-government; only through the unfettered exchange of ideas can
the electorate make informed and effective decisions. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Bran-
deis, J., concurring). Second, free speech serves as a safety valve in society by channeling
potentially violent energy into peaceful forms of expression and public dialogue. Id. Fi-
nally, freedom of speech is justified as an end in itself, for an individual must be free to
speak and hear in order to realize his full human potential. Id.
231. Commercial speech has been defined as "speech of any form that advertises a
product or service for profit or for business purpose." J. NOWAK, supra note 228, at 923.
232. G. GUNTHER, supra note 124, at 972. For a discussion of permissible restrictions
on commercial speech and the two step analysis used by the Court to determine whether
a governmental restriction on commercial speech violates the first amendment, see infra
notes 241-254 and accompanying text.
233. For a discussion of the end of the old commercial speech doctrine in Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976),
see infra notes 239-247 and accompanying text. In an earlier case, the Court indicated
that the first amendment might be used to protect purely commercial speech, but did
not explicitly so hold. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (advertisement announc-
ing availability of legal abortions protected by the first amendment).
234. See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). See also Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) ("We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.").
235. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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Court upheld a New York City ordinance banning the public
distribution of handbills containing advertising matter.236 In
what has become known as the "commercial speech doctrine,"
the Court stated that although the first amendment would pre-
vent state and city authorities from totally prohibiting commu-
nication by handbills, it "imposes no such restraint on govern-
ment as respects purely commercial advertising. 23 7 The effect of
Valentine was to exclude completely commercial speech from
first amendment protection. For the next three decades, com-
mercial speech was viewed as inferior to speech that concerned
political or social information because it sought merely to im-
prove the economic position of the speaker. Commercial speech
was therefore regulated like any other economic activity.38
The end of the old "commercial speech doctrine" came
about in 1976, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 39 when the Supreme Court
held that a state cannot prohibit pharmacists from advertising
their prices since the consuming public has a protected first
amendment interest in the free flow of truthful information con-
cerning a lawful activity.2 '0 The Virginia Board Court made it
clear that commercial speech, like other varieties, is protected.
However this did not mean commercial speech could never be
236. Id. at 54. The Court upheld an entrepreneur's conviction for distributing leaf-
lets which advertised a commercial exhibition of a former Navy submarine. Id. at 55.
237. Id. at 54.
238. See Comment, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment-Continuing Un-
certainty After Six Years, 12 CAP. U.L. REV. 115, 122 n.38 (1982) (citing Breard v. Alex-
andria, 341 U.S. 622 (1950)).
239. 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (invalidating statute making illegal the advertisement of
prescription drug prices as unprofessional conduct).
240. Id. at 773. Commercial speech rights have been recognized in an increasing
number of advertising areas: Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (striking
down state limitations on attorney advertising); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating a prohibition of any advertisement or display of contracep-
tives, a product which was not only legal but constitutionally protected); Linmark Asso-
ciates v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (holding that first amendment does
not permit a municipality to prohibit by ordinance the posting of "For Sale" or "Sold"
signs even though the town acted to stem what it perceived as the flight of white home-
owners from a racially integrated community); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (invalidating state regulation banning all pub-
lic utility advertising which promoted the use of electricity, finding the state's ban
broader than necessary to further the state interest in energy conservation).
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regulated.241 The Court set forth three types of permissible re-
strictions on commercial speech.
First, it noted that mere time, place, or manner " s2 restric-
tions are often proper provided "they are justified without refer-
ence to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a
significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the infor-
mation. 2 43 Second, restrictions on false, deceptive, or mislead-
ing speech are permissible 4 4 since the first amendment does not
prohibit the state from insuring that the stream of commercial
information flows cleanly as well as freely. 45 The third permissi-
ble restriction on commercial speech, according to the Court, is
on commercial speech which proposes illegal transactions.
2 14
Since Virginia Board made it clear that commercial speech
is not absolutely protected by the first amendment,2 47 a two-step
method of analysis ' 48 has been developed in the modern speech
cases to determine whether the regulation of commercial speech
violates the first amendment. The first step is to determine
whether the speech is truthful, nonmisleading speech concerning
a lawful commercial activity. If the government is attempting to
restrict or punish false or misleading advertising, it will not be
241. Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 770.
242. Id. at 771. In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Justice Powell, writing for the
Court, argued that the restriction was only of the manner in which the SFAA expressed
itself and did not prohibit the SFAA from conveying its message. San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971, 2981 (1987). See supra
text accompanying note 46.
243. Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 771. Dissenting in San Francisco Arts & Athletics,
Justice Brennan found the Amateur Sports Act to violate the first amendment by re-
stricting speech in a way that was not content neutral. 107 S. Ct. at 2999 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
244. Id. Justice Stewart elaborated on this issue in his concurrence. Unlike libel ac-
tions, where the first amendment offers some protection in the appropriate circum-
stances even for false factual statements, the commercial advertiser is generally not
under the deadline pressures of the press, knows the product or service he seeks to sell,
and is in a position to verify the accuracy of his statements; consequently there is little
danger that state regulation of false or misleading price or product advertising will chill
nondeceptive commercial expression. Id. at 777-78 (Stewart, J., concurring).
245. Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 772.
246. Id. at 772 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376
(1973)).
247. Id. at 770.
248. NOWAK, supra note 86, at 924.
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subjected to an overbreadth analysis 24 9 and will therefore not be
required to show that its law is no more extensive than neces-
sary to achieve that purpose. 5°
After the court has found that the regulation restricts non-
misleading commercial communications, the second step is to
determine whether the governmental regulation directly ad-
vances a substantial governmental interest without unnecessary
restrictions on freedom of speech.2 5 Under this balancing test,
the governmental regulation will fail if the government interest
is not sufficiently substantial to justify a restriction on speech or
if the means used to advance such an interest either do not di-
rectly advance the governmental interest or do so with an un-
necessary burden on the ability to communicate the commercial
message. 52 Since the Virginia Board decision, only two govern-
mental regulations of advertising have survived this analysis,
and both did so on the ground that the commercial speech at
issue tended to be misleading.2 53 Of the two, Friedman v. Rog-
ers "  is of particular interest since it illustrates the principle
that the government can constitutionally restrict the use of
trademarks as long as that use is found to be deceptive or
misleading.
249. An overbroad statute is one that is designed to burden or punish activities
which are not constitutionally protected, but the statute includes within its scope activi-
ties which are protected by the first amendment. See NOWAK, supra note 86, at 840. See
also Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Ra-
tionales For The Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 158, 159 (False or
deceptive commercial speech receives no protection from the first amendment. There-
fore, traditional trademark theory with its historic emphasis on consumer deception and
confusion is well within constitutional bounds.).
250. See NowAK, supra note 86, at 924.
251. Id.
252. Id. In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, the majority found that the Amateur
Sports Act restricted mainly commercial speech and therefore applied a similar test,
which required a balancing between the governmental interest and the magnitude of the
speech restriction. 107 S. Ct. at 2981. This test is essentially the same as the four-part
test in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
253. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (upholding prohibi-
tion of in-person solicitation of clients by attorneys for pecuniary gain); Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1978) (upholding ban on optometrists' use of trade names in
advertising).
254. 440 U.S. 1.
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b. Trademark Law
First amendment rights have been limited by trademark
laws. The traditional purpose of trademark law has been to se-
cure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to
enable consumers to distinguish among competing products.2"
Several rationales have been advanced in support of trademark
protection.
(1) The Confusion Rationale
The law of trademarks has its roots in the common-law ac-
tion of deceit in which a member of the public claimed that he
was deceived into buying a merchant's product through the lat-
ter's misleading adoption of a competitor's trademark.2" A
trademark was the owner's means of identifying his products.
The owner's rights extended only to those situations where cus-
tomers were led to believe that the infringer's products
originated with the trademark owner.2 57 Thus, the concept of
customer confusion is the touchstone of traditional trademark
theory.258
Early courts even required that the trademark owner show
actual consumer confusion. 259 This requirement was dispensed
255. S. KANE, TRADEMARK LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 11-12 (1987).
256. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal
Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 311 (1979). The trademark owner itself was powerless
to prevent unauthorized uses of the mark. Id. In time, however, courts of equity began to
allow these trademark owners injunctive relief against a competitor's use of the mark. Id.
at 313.
Trademarks are also afforded legal protection under state statutory provisions. See,
e.g., MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL (1964), reprinted in 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 22:4. The infringement of federally registered marks is gov-
erned by the comprehensive registration and enforcement provisions of the Trademark
Act of 1946, commonly known as the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982 & Supp.
1986).
257. See, e.g., Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) ("A trade mark
only gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner's good will
against the sale of another's product as his."). During the first half of the twentieth
century, the owner's protection expanded to noncompeting goods, but this did nothing to
undermine the dominance of the confusion rationale. See Denicola, supra note 249, at
163-64.
258. See Denicola, supra note 249, at 160.
259. Note, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment Analysis, 72 VA.
L. REV. 1079, 1082 (1986).
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with, however, and the test for trademark infringement came to
focus instead upon the likelihood of such confusion.6 0 This like-
lihood of confusion standard is utilized by the federal trademark
statute, the Lanham Act,261 as well as by state statutory
provisions.2
Reliance on the confusion rationale as the primary basis of
liability, which restricts judicial intervention to instances in
which the mark is used to misrepresent the source or sponsor-
ship of goods or services, has insulated traditional trademark
doctrine from constitutional attack.26" Regulation of deceptive or
misleading commercial speech presents no constitutional diffi-
culties.26 ' Thus, under the traditional confusion rationale, the
rights afforded a trademark owner are not restricted by the first
amendment. However, trademark law has sometimes ventured
beyond the confines of the traditional confusion model265 by
260. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.M. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 56 F.2d 973, 976
(10th Cir. 1932) (affirming lower court's injunction restraining Standard Oil Company of
New Mexico from using that name because it was so similar to plaintiff-Standard Oil
Company of California that it was probable the public would be confused). See also 2 J.
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23.1 (2d ed. 1984).
261. The essential question in any suit brought under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1051-1127 (1982 & Supp. 1986), is "whether a substantial number of ordinarily prudent
purchasers are likely to be misled or confused as to the source of the different products."
Mushroom Makers Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 441 F. Supp. 1220, 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff'd, 580 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979). Section 32 of the
Lanham Act authorizes a civil action to remedy any unauthorized use that "is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1982 &
Supp. 1986).
262. State trademark provisions supplement the common law and, with the excep-
tion of the antidilution provisions, merely restate the confusion rationale. See Denicola,
supra note 249, at 161. For a discussion of antidilution provisions, see infra notes 286-
299 and accompanying text.
263. See Denicola, supra note 249, at 165.
264. Id. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Obviously, much commercial speech is not provably false, or even wholly false, but
only deceptive or misleading. We foresee no obstacle to a State's dealing effec-
tively with this problem. The First Amendment, as we construe it today, does not
prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow
cleanly as well as freely.
Id. at 771-72. See also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). "[T]he State
does not lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public
whenever speech is a component of that activity." Id. at 456. For a discussion of permis-
sible restrictions of commercial speech, see supra notes 241-246 and accompanying text.
265. See generally Denicola, supra note 249, at 158. See also infra notes 250-279
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those seeking to extend the scope of trademark protection. 6 '
The rationales employed in this pursuit are more closely allied
with property 67 than with tort.268 Under the misappropriation
and dilution rationales, which utilize the property conception of
trademark rights, there is no need for a showing of confusion,
and "[w]hen consumer confusion ceases to be the touchstone...
the accommodation between trademark law and the first amend-
ment becomes more problematic. 26 9
(2) Misappropriation Rationale
The common law tort of misappropriation was born2 70 in a
1918 Supreme Court decision which upheld an injunction
prohibiting the International News Service ("INS") from appro-
priating the news of the Associated Press ("AP") in a competing
news service, until its commercial value to the AP had dissi-
pated, despite the absence of any misrepresentation as to the
source of the news.27' The Court described defendant INS's
wrong as "taking material that has been acquired by the plain-
tiff AP as the result of organization and the expenditure of la-
bor, skill and money, and.., in appropriating it and selling it as
its own."'2 7 2 In characterizing the AP's interest in the news, the
Court chose the term "quasi-property. 27 3 The misappropriation
doctrine has been broadly invoked2 74 to remedy injuries result-
and accompanying text (discussing two alternative models: misappropriation and dilu-
tion rationales).
266. See generally Denicola, supra note 249.
267. The exclusive right to use a particular symbol to distinguish the source of
goods was denominated a property right by the Supreme Court in the Trademark Cases,
100 U.S. 82 (1879). This property conception of trademark rights has generally remained
subsidiary to notions of deception and commercial morality. See generally McClure,
Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal Thought, 69 TRADE-
MARK REP. 305 (1979).
268. See Denicola, supra note 249, at 166.
269. Id.
270. Unlike most common-law causes of action, which mature gradually and are
"eventually acknowledged by an appropriate christening, the tort of misappropriation is
generally considered to have sprung full-blown" out of International News Serv. v. Asso-
ciated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). See Denicola, supra note 249, at 171-72.
271. International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 242.
272. Id. at 239. For a discussion of similar reasoning used by the San Francisco Arts
& Athletics majority, see supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
273. International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 236.
274. This theory has been used to enjoin the following unauthorized activities:
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ing from the misappropriation of a plaintiff's "quasi-property"
interest in commercial assets created by his investment of effort,
time, and money.275 Even the Supreme Court has used the mis-
appropriation doctrine to protect a performer from the appro-
priation of his act by a television station.276
The exclusive right to control the commercial exploitation
of famous trademarks is a specific application of this general
common-law action for misappropriation. 77 Although many
trademark "misappropriation" cases premise liability on confu-
sion of "association" or "connection," that "association" or
"connection" may refer to the simple fact that the sight of a
familiar trademark will call to mind the trademark owner, and
broadcasting of professional baseball games, Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcast-
ing Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938); National Exhibition Co. v. Fass, 143 N.Y.S.2d
767 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Mutual Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Muzak Corp., 177 Misc. 489, 30
N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1941); the publishing of answers to problems appearing in a col-
lege textbook, Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. v. Brown, 207 F. Supp. 678 (E.D.N.Y. 1962);
record and tape pirating, A & M Records, Inc. v. M.V.C. Distrib. Corp., 574 F.2d 312
(6th Cir. 1978); Gai Audio of N.Y., Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 27 Md. App. 172,
340 A.2d 736 (1975); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 134 N.J.
Super. 368, 341 A.2d 348 (1975); Mercury Record Prod., Inc. v. Economic Consultants,
Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 163, 218 N.W.2d 705 (1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 914 (1975); sale
of photos of a World's Fair, New York World's Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v. Colourpicture
Pub., Inc., 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 939 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964), aff'd, 21 A.D.2d 896, 251
N.Y.S.2d 885 (1964); recordings of the Metropolitan Opera, Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v.
Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd,
279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951); radio stations relying on newspaper subscriptions
rather than news bureaus, Associated Press v. KVOS, 80 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1935); Veatch
v. Wagner, 116 F. Supp. 904 (D. Alaska 1953); Pottstown Daily News Pub. Co. v. Potts-
town Broadcasting Co., 411 Pa. 383, 192 A.2d 657 (1963); trade journals that have appro-
priated information from competitors, McCord Co. v. Plotnick, 108 Cal. App. 2d 392, 239
P.2d 32 (1951); Bond Buyer v. Dealer Digest Pub. Co., 25 A.D.2d 158, 267 N.Y.S.2d 944
(1966); Gilmore v. Sammons, 269 S.W. 861 (Tex. Ct. App. 1925).
275. See Denicola, supra note 249, at 173.
276. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). The plain-
tiff brought a damages action against the defendant-broadcast station for "unlawful ap-
propriation" of his "professional property" when his 15-second "human cannonball" act
was filmed in its entirety by the defendant and shown on a television news program later
the same day. Id. The Court found that the act was the product of the plaintiff's own
talents and energy, the end result of much time, effort, and expense, and that defend-
ant's broadcast posed a substantial threat to the economic value of plaintiff's perform-
ance since, if the public could see the act on television for free, it would be less willing to
pay to see it at the fair. Id. at 575.
277. See Denicola, supra note 249, at 171. "Given the universality of the moral ad-
monitions that underlie the concept of misappropriation, its appearance in the law of
trademarks is hardly surprising." Id. at 174.
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not that the defendant is in any way endorsed or sponsored by
or otherwise commercially affiliated with the trademark
owner.2 78 In one such case, various National Hockey League
teams succeeded in obtaining an injunction against the sale of
"patches," or cloth emblems, featuring reproductions of the
teams' trademarks even though the defendant was willing to in-
clude a notice on its "patches" stating that they were not au-
thorized by the teams.27 9 In applying this rationale, the courts
have also enjoined: the manufacture and sale of Volkswagen cus-
tomizing kits employing a grill and hood ornament resembling
that of a Rolls-Royce; 280 the use of the mark "JAWS" on food
disposers;281 and the use of the words "DAILY PLANET" as a
newspaper title.282
However, this effort to expand trademark rights has been
challenged in numerous decisions struggling to keep trademark
rights fixed to the traditional limits of the confusion rationale.
Such decisions distinguish between uses that cause the public to
bring the plaintiff to mind and those that actually deceive,
thereby refusing to prevent the appropriation of trade symbols
in the absence of confusion.8 ' Absent public confusion, even the
278. Id. at 167-68.
279. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d
1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). Other "patches" cases have had similar
results: Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Reliable Knitting Works, Inc., 178 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 274 (E.D. Wis. 1973); National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Dallas Cap &
Emblem Mfg., Inc., 26 Ill. App. 3d 820, 327 N.E.2d 247 (1975); National Football League
Properties, Inc. v. Consumer Enterprises, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 3d 814, 327 N.E.2d 242, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). See generally Fletcher, Still More About Patches, 67
TRADEMARK REP. 76 (1977) (by counsel for Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n).
280. Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Ga.
1976).
281. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
852 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (enjoined because of the possibility of "association" or "connection"
with the motion picture of that title).
282. D C Comics, Inc. v. Powers, 465 F. Supp. 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). "Moreover, in
the case at bar, I find substantial evidence indicating that the adoption by defendants of
the name Daily Planet in 1969 was merely an attempt to cash in on the Superman story
and its notoriety." Id. at 849.
283. See, e.g., Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980) (hold-
ing garbage bag seller's use of "Bagzilla" name and figure and slogan "monstrously
strong bags" posed no likelihood of confusing consumers by suggestion that bags were
made, sponsored, or endorsed by creators of Godzilla character); Carson v. Here's
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (holding entertainer
failed to establish that use of the trademark "Here's Johnny Portable Toilets" presented
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Girl Scouts were unable to enjoin the use of their trademarks on
a poster depicting a pregnant Girl Scout and captioned, "Be
Prepared."284
Another objection to the misappropriation rationale is that
a plaintiff relying on this theory of trademark infringement
presents a much weaker case than one who claims the use causes
confusion or deception. In the misappropriation cases, the plain-
tiff cannot be seen as the protector of consumer interests, who
seeks redress both for personal wrongs and for general fraud on
the public.2 85
(3) Dilution Rationale
The dilution theory, like the misappropriation rationale,
utilizes the property conception of trademark rights and is
therefore not dependent upon a showing of confusion or other
public injury.8 6 The dilution theory for the protection of trade-
marks was first set forth in a 1927 law review article which con-
sidered the use of similar marks on noncompeting goods:
a likelihood of confusion and therefore failed to establish trademark infringement);
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Chandris America Lines, Inc.,
321 F. Supp. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (use of circus operator's trademark "Greatest Show on
Earth" in phrase "Greatest Show on Earth Isn't" in advertisment of Caribbean cruise
was not likely to cause confusion and was therefore not a trademark infringement); Uni-
versity of Notre Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 22 A.D. 452, 256
N.Y.S.2d 301, aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 940, 207 N.E.2d 508, 259 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1965) (injunction
denied to University of Notre Dame prohibiting the use of its name and symbols in a
film that parodied its football program).
284. Girl Scouts of the United States of America v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co.,
304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
285. See Denicola, supra note 249, at 176. Although it may be easy to underestimate
the significance of consumer interest in trademark litigation, as early as 1883, the Su-
preme Court stated that relief for the owner of a mark was appropriate "not only as a
matter of justice to him, but to prevent imposition upon the public." Manhattan
Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U.S. 218, 223 (1883).
286. See Denicola, supra note 249, at 183. As previously noted, when trademark
protection is delimited by the confusion rationale, recourse to first amendment principles
is unnecessary. See supra notes 263-264 and accompanying text. However, when trade-
mark owners are invoking the misappropriation and dilution rationales with increased
frequency and the internal limitations of the confusion rationale are abandoned, "free
speech rights must enter the calculus of competing interests." See Denicola, supra note
249, at 190. "The first amendment implications of the broad and ill-defined rights associ-
ated with misappropriation and dilution theory, however, have received little attention."
Id.
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The real injury in all such cases can only be gauged in the
light of what has been said concerning the function of a trade-
mark. It is the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the iden-
tity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its
use upon non-competing goods. The more distinctive or unique
the mark, the deeper is its impress upon the public consciousness,
and the greater its need for protection against vitiation or dissoci-
ation from the particular product in connection with which it has
been used.2 7
Although the dilution rationale was never expressly incorpo-
rated into federal trademark legislation, 88 several states have
enacted antidilution statutes designed "to protect a distinctive
trademark from the gradual whittling away of its distinctiveness
through use by third parties on nonconfusing, noncompeting
products."2 89 The rationale of an antidilution statute is that the
more the public sees a given mark, the more the value and ad-
vertising impact of that mark deteriorates. 90 One court, in en-
joining the use of the word "Tiffany's" by a Boston lounge,
found it diluted the distinctiveness of the New York jeweler's
mark and characterized the nature of the injury as a "risk of an
erosion of the public's identification of this very strong mark
with the plaintiff alone, thus diminishing its distinctiveness, uni-
queness, effectiveness, and prestigious connotations. '"2 91
Additionally, the business reputation of the trademark
owner may be subject to tarnishment2 92 These antidilution stat-
287. Comment, The Rationale Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 H~Av. L. REV.
813, 825 (1927).
288. See Denicola, supra note 249, at 182.
289. 1 J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 5.05[9], at 41.
290. Id. at 41.
291. Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836, 844 (D. Mass. 1964).
292. The Tiffany court identified plaintiff's additional interest:
[O]r the risk may be that of detracting from the plaintiff's good will by the possi-
bility that defendant's use of plaintiff's unique mark will tarnish plaintiff's trade
name by reason of public dissatisfaction with defendant's product and a resultant
holding of this dissatisfaction against plaintiff. An alternative to this second risk is
the danger of public identification of plaintiff's trade name or mark with a prod-
uct or service of a type incompatible with the quality and prestige previously at-
tached by the public to the plaintiff's product.
Id. at 844. Although this threat of tarnishment may arise in the absence of confusion if
the trademark is used in a manner that undermines its positive image, the courts have
forestalled this form of injury by covert manipulation of the confusion rationale. See
Denicola, supra note 249, at 186. Courts have used the confusion rationale to enjoin: the
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utes have been significantly influenced by the Model State
Trademark Bill, which states:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the
distinctive quality of a mark registered under this Act, or a mark
valid at common law, or a trade name valid at common law, shall
be a ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of
competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to
the source of goods or services.' "
Those states possessing antidilution statutes have generally
given them a narrow application. 9" Judicial reluctance to accept
antidilution statutes may be due to a desire to tailor state trade-
mark law to federal trademark law (the Lanham Act),295 thus
avoiding a federal-state confrontation. Further, there may be
skepticism about this particular form of ownership protection
since an owner's interest in the distinctiveness of his mark, a
bewildering, ill-defined intangible, is usually adequately pro-
tected by the broadening confusion standards.29 Lastly, judicial
reluctance to give these antidilution statutes more than a narrow
use of "Genital Electric" on T-shirts and briefs, General Electric Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co.,
205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1036 (D. Mass. 1979); the use of a well-known "Enjoy Coca-Cola"
design on a poster featuring a facsimile of the symbol, but advocating instead, "Enjoy
Cocaine," Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); a
pornographic movie featuring an actress occasionally clad in a Dallas Cowboys Cheer-
leader's uniform, Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc., v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d
200 (2d Cir. 1979); a poster depicting a group of former Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders
wearing only a portion of their former attire, Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979); and the use of the slogan "Where
there's life . . . there's Bud" by an insecticide manufacturer who substituted the word
"Bugs" for "Bud," Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433
(5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963). The dilution statutes provide a more
explicit approach to the tarnishment problem and many recent opinions do utilize them
as an alternative ground for relief. See, e.g., Pussycat Cinema, 604 F.2d 200; Gucci
Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Tiffany, 231 F. Supp.
836.
293. MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL § 12 (1964), reprinted in 2 J. MCCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 22:4 (2d ed. 1984).
294. See J. GILSON, supra note 289, at 55.
295. The Lanham Act does not protect against dilution; however the legislative his-
tory of the Lanham Act gives little support for the notion that Congress, in declining to
protect mark owners against dilution, intended to pre-empt, insofar as interstate com-
merce is concerned, state dilution statutes. See Note, Dilution: Trademark Infringement
or Will-O'-The Wisp?, 77 HARV. L. REV. 520, 524 (1964). See also S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
296. See Note, supra note 295, at 528-29.
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application may result from the fact that, unlike the confusion
case, there is no public interest to tip the balance in favor of the
trademark owner.29 Despite this judicial reluctance, trademark
owners increasingly are pressing claims under both the misap-
propriation and the dilution theory.2 s9 It is interesting to note
that the USOC, itself, included in its complaint a cause of action
under the California antidilution statute,2 99 as it has in other
cases decided under section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act.300
B. Other USOC Cases
Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Com-
mittee301 was the first case30 2 decided under section 110 of the
Amateur Sports Act and was not one initiated by the USOC.
Instead, the USOC was sued by a nonprofit public interest or-
ganization, Stop the Olympic Prison ("STOP"), which opposed
construction of housing for athletes participating in the 1980
Lake Placid Winter Olympic Games because the housing was to
be converted into a federal prison after the games. As a protest,
STOP designed and distributed posters displaying the Olympic
Rings and Torch and bearing the inscription "STOP THE
OLYMPIC PRISON." 0 3 Refusing to comply-with a letter from
the USOC requesting that it cease using the Olympic designa-
tions, STOP sought a declaratory judgment that it had a first
amendment right to print and distribute its poster and to use
the word "Olympic" and the symbol of the interlocking rings as
an expression of opposition to the prison. 4 In addition, STOP
297. Id. at 529. For a discussion of similar criticisms of the misappropriation ration-
ale, see supra note 285.
298. "The notion of trademark misappropriation even in the absence of any likeli-
hood of confusion is evident in much of the current case law, and the long dormant
concept of trademark dilution appears poised to further expand the scope of trademark
rights." See Denicola, supra note 249, at 159.
299. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1987).
300. See, e.g., Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Comm., 489 F.
Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). For a discussion of Stop the Olympic Prison, see infra notes
301-315 and accompanying text.
301. 489 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
302. It should be noted that this was the only case decided under section 110 of the
Amateur Sports Act that the USOC lost.
303. Stop the Olympic Prison, 489 F. Supp. at 1114-15.
304. Id. at 1116.
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sought a judgment declaring that its use of the word "Olympic"
and the interlocking rings violated neither the trademark rights
of the USOC nor former section 379 of title 36.305 The USOC
counterclaimed for trademark infringement under section 110,
traditional trademark infringement and false designation of ori-
gin under sections 32(1)306 and 43(a)307 of the Lanham Act, vio-
lation of New York's antidilution and disparagement laws, and
defamation.308
The court in Stop the Olympic Prison recognized that sec-
tion 110 could not be interpreted to mean that only the USOC
and its licensees were allowed to use the Olympic designations,
and therefore sought to determine the range of uses to which the
USOC could properly claim exclusive right under section 110.309
The court held that STOP's poster violated neither subsections
(a) nor (c) of section 110 because the posters were not used "for
the purpose of trade, to induce the sale of any goods or services,
or to promote any theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or
competition. '"3 10 The essentially noncommercial use of the
Olympic designations was held not to be within the range of uses
for which the USOC could claim exclusive rights under the Am-
ateur Sports Act."
The court dismissed the balance of the USOC's counter-
claims since the USOC failed to prove trademark infringe-
ment,"' produced no evidence of trademark dilution,1 3 and
failed to prove STOP's poster was false or misleading, thus viti-
ating USOC's disparagement claim.31 4 Although the court found
305. Id. STOP had failed in its complaint before the enactment of the Amateur
Sports Act. The action should therefore have been decided under former section 379. Id.
at 1117-18. However, the court applied section 110 of the act because both parties as-
sumed it would apply. Id. at 1118.
306. The Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), Pub. L. No. 87-772, § 32, 60 Stat.
437 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976)).
307. The Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), § 43, 60 Stat. 441 (codified at 15
U.S.C § 1125 (1976)).
308. Stop the Olympic Prison, 489 F. Supp. at 1116.
309. Id. at 1119.
310. Id. at 1118-19 (quoting section 110).
311. Id. at 1119. This case is important in that it stands for the proposition that
section 110 does not prohibit the noncommercial use of the Olympic designations.
312. Id. at 1121-22.
313. Id. at 1123.
314. Id. at 1124.
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it unnecessary to address STOP's first amendment claim, it did
imply that a use which did not mislead viewers into assuming
that the USOC endorsed the user's viewpoint might be pro-
tected by the first amendment. 1
In United States Olympic Committee v. International Fed-
eration of Bodybuilders,31 6 the range of uses test developed in
Stop the Olympic Prison 17 was abandoned."' 8 Instead, the
USOC was granted relief on the rationale that an unauthorized
use of an Olympic designation would dilute that designation's
value to the USOC, thus making it less marketable.3 19 The de-
fendant, International Federation of Bodybuilders ("IFBB"),
was a nonprofit organization which annually sponsored the well-
known professional body building contest entitled "Mr. Olym-
pia" and also published magazines about bodybuilding.2 0 Wei-
der Health and Fitness was a codefendant engaged in selling
health food supplements and sporting equipment under the
names "Joe Weider Olympians" and "Olympian" through its
subsidiary, the defendant I. Brute Enterprises.32 ' Two health
food stores which sold Weider's products were also defendants
in the case.
The USOC sought de novo review of a 1974 Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board decision which permitted, over USOC's
objection, the registration of the word "Mr. Olympia" as a ser-
vice mark for IFBB's professional muscle beauty contest, as well
as an injunction to prevent the defendants from using the "Mr.
Olympia" mark in any manner. The court agreed with the
Board's conclusion that there was no likelihood of confusion be-
tween the USOC's use of the mark "Olympic" and the IFBB's
use of the mark "Olympia. 322 Next, the court held that all of
315. Id. at 1126.
316. 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 353 (D.D.C. 1982).
317. See supra notes 309-311 and accompanying text (discussing Stop the Olympic
Prison).
318. Bodybuilders, 219 U.S.P.Q. at 360-61. The court makes no reference to the
"range of uses" test in its analysis.
319. Id. at 360.
320. Id. at 354-56.
321. Id. at 354.
322. Id. at 357-58, 360. The court also noted that the IFBB had been using the mark
since 1965 with no evidence of confusion between that contest and the Olympic Games
and that there were significant differences between the two events. The Olympic Games
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the defendants except the IFBB 23 had violated section 110324
and consequently issued an injunction preventing the remaining
defendants from using any Olympic designations or simulations
thereof.
25
The antidilution rationale was utilized again in United
States Olympic Committee v. Union Sport Apparel,3"2 in find-
ing a section 110 violation. Defendant Union Sport Apparel mar-
keted apparel and related accessories displaying a logo of three
interlocking rings along with the letters "U.S.A. '3 27 As in
Bodybuilders,28 the Union Sport Apparel court issued a perma-
nent injunction and an order for impoundment of the defend-
ant's infringing goods and manufacturing materials. However,
unlike the court in Bodybuilders, the Union Sport Apparel
court issued an order awarding the USOC treble damages, its
costs and attorneys' fees, and defendant's wrongful profits.2 9
The commercial marketing of the five-ring Olympic symbol
in the United States without the USOC's consent was found to
be violative of section 110 in United States Olympic Commit-
tee v. Intelicense Corp.330 Defendant Intelicense had entered
into agreements with the IOC under which Intelicense was
granted exclusive worldwide rights to market official Olympic
pictograms.3 3 ' However, as a prerequisite to the marketing of the
pictograms in the territory of each National Olympic Committee
("NOC"), the agreements provided that Intelicense must first
secure the approval of each NOC. Ignoring the USOC's refusal
of permission to market the pictograms in the United States, In-
were an amateur sports event held every four years whereas the "Mr. Olympia" contest
was an annual professional theatrical exhibition. Id.
323. Id. at 357. Section 110 was held inapplicable to the IFBB because the IFBB
had registered its mark in 1974, four years prior to the enactment of section 110. Id.
324. Id. at 357, 361.
325. Id. at 363.
326. 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 526 (E.D. Va. 1983).
327. Id. at 527.
328. 219 U.S.P.Q. 353.
329. Union Sports Apparel, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 530-31. The court noted that while sec-
tion 110 was an independent cause of action, it afforded the USOC the same kinds of
remedies available under the Lanham Act. Id. at 529.
330. 737 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1984).
331. Id. at 265. The pictograms were graphic designs of athletes participating in
various summer and winter sports against a backdrop of the five Olympic interlocking
rings. Id.
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telicense proceeded to license the use of pictograms on products
marketed in the United States."3 2 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in affirming the district court's issuance of a per-
manent injunction, examined the history of section 110 and con-
cluded that it could not "imagine a more blatant violation of the
Act. ,333
C. Application to San Francisco Arts & Athletics
Section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act, as interpreted by
the San Francisco Arts & Athletics Court, bestows upon the
USOC something more than a trademark. 3 This interpretation
renders the Amateur Sports Act unconstitutional because it pro-
hibits a substantial amount of constitutionally protected
speech. 5 Unlike the Lanham Act, which affords traditional
trademark protection delimited by the confusion rationale33 and
thereby confined to the realm of commercial speech,3 section
110 regulates noncommercial as well as commercial speech338 be-
cause its protection is not delimited by the confusion
rationale.33 9
332. Id.
333. Id. at 267.
334. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2978. See also id. at 2994 n.20
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Nowhere in the Legislative History is there any hint that
Congress equated USOC's word-use authority over "Olympic" with its trademark
power.").
335. 107 S. Ct. at 2994 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
336. See 15 U.S.C. § 1066. See also Denicola, supra note 249, at 190 ("When trade-
mark protection is delimited by the confusion rationale, recourse to constitutional princi-
ples is unnecessary.").
337.
A key Lanham Act requirement that limits the impact of trademarks on noncom-
mercial speech is the rule that a trademark violation occurs only when an offend-
ing trademark is applied to commercial goods and services. The Amateur Sports
Act is not similarly qualified. Section 110 (a) (4) "allows the USOC to prohibit the
use of 'Olympic' for promotion of theatrical and athletic events," even if such uses
"go beyond the 'strictly business' context."
107 S. Ct. at 2997 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
338. Id. Section 110(a)(4) "necessarily regulates only noncommercial speech, since
every possible commercial use of the word 'olympic' is regulated by preceding sections of
the statute." Id.
339. Id. at 2997. See also Denicola, supra note 249, at 190 ("When the internal limi-
tations of the confusion rationale are abandoned, free speech rights must enter the
calculus of competing interests.").
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The SFAA is a California nonprofit corporation chartered to
conduct public cultural events, including athletic competitions
and arts activities, "to educate the general public on the vitality,
variety and versatility of the gay movement," and to "help bal-
ance the onslaught of the Moral Majority's perspective as to
homosexuals and to demonstrate the gay community's noncom-
mercial involvement in a healthy endeavor. '340 The SFAA's use
of the word "Olympic" was certainly noncommercial s4 ' and
could well be termed "political speech. 3 42 Although the Court
conceded that "some" uses of "Olympic" prohibited under sec-
tion 110 may involve noncommercial (expressive) speech, 43 the
majority proceeded to discount the importance of this possible
first amendment infringement.
First, the Court held that section 110 merely restricted the
manner in which the SFAA could convey its message.4 Section
110 cannot be regarded as a mere time, place, and manner stat-
ute, however, since by preventing the use of the word
"Olympic," the Act violates the first amendment by prohibiting
dissemination of a message for which there is no adequate
translation.34 5
Then, reasoning that section 110 applied mainly to commer-
cial speech, the Court ignored the SFAA's noncommercial use of
340. Brief for SFAA, San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic
Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987) (No. 86-270) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Supreme Court
Briefs file).
341. The incidental monetary transactions occurring when "Gay Olympics I" spon-
sors used "Olympic" on their posters and T-shirts, which were sold to raise money for
their nonprofit corporate cause, do not fit the definition of commercial speech. Speech
containing a subsidiary commercial element is not thereby transformed into the less pro-
tected form of "commercial speech." Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943).
First amendment free expression need not be "free" in the monetary sense to receive full
protection under the first amendment. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
265-66 (1964) (paid advertisement does not lose its first amendment protection, for its
content of political and ideological speech, because of the subsidiary fact that the adver-
tisement was paid for).
342. For a discussion of the first amendment protection afforded political speech,
see supra notes 227-230 and accompanying text.
343. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2980.
344. Id. at 2981.
345. Id. at 2998 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "[A] title such as 'The Best and Most
Accomplished Amateur Gay Athletes Competition' would not serve as an adequate trans-
lation of [the SFAA's] message." Id. (citing International Olympic Comm. v. San Fran-
cisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., 789 F.2d 1319, 1321 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J. dissenting)).
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the word "Olympic," applied the test for determining the consti-
tutionality of restrictions on nonmisleading commercial speech,
and held that the incidental restrictions on the SFAA's freedom
of speech were no greater than necessary to further a substantial
government interest.346 Even if section 110 could be character-
ized as directly regulating only commercial speech, 47 its inciden-
tal restrictions are still greater than necessary to further a sub-
stantial government interest. As Justice Brennan points out in
his dissent, even without section 110(a)(4), the USOC would
have the authority under the Lanham Act to enforce its
"Olympic" trademark against commercial uses of the word that
might cause consumer confusion and a loss of the mark's distinc-
tiveness .3 4  The record provided no evidence that the USOC's
protection under the Lanham Act was insufficient to safeguard
against economic harm. 49
Continuing under the erroneous assumption that section
110 regulates mainly commercial speech, it was necessary to de-
termine whether the restrictions on free speech were in further-
ance of a substantial governmental interest. The purpose of the
grant of the "trademark plus" in the word "Olympic" was to en-
hance the fundraising ability of the USOC.3 50 The substantiality
of the government's interest here is highly questionable, 51 espe-
cially when what is essentially a mere subsidization is purported
to justify interference with the first amendment rights of others.
Moreover, the Court's finding that Congress' interest in the
USOC was substantial is incredible in light of its simultaneous
holding that Congress' involvement with the USOC was so mi-
nor that the USOC was not a "government actor" for fifth
amendment purposes.
346. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2981.
347. For a discussion of section 110's restrictions on noncommercial speech, see
supra notes 336-339 and accompanying text.
348. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2999 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
349. Id.
350. "Section 110 directly advances these governmental interests [promoting the
USOC's activities] by supplying the USOC with the means to raise money to support the
Olympics and encourages the USOC's activities by ensuring that it will receive the bene-
fits of its efforts." San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 2982.
351. See 789 F.2d 1319, 1324 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("If this is the
only interest supporting the USOC's monopoly, I seriously doubt whether it would jus-
tify even a minor restriction of free speech.").
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V. Conclusion
In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, the Supreme Court
achieved the absurd. It simultaneously adopted two contradic-
tory conclusions: the USOC carries out a significant national
mission that deserves protection against individuals exercising
their first amendment rights, and the USOC's relationship with
the national government is too insignificant to make the USOC's
activities "state action" subject to the restrictions of the fifth
amendment.
The Court's holding that section 110 did not violate the first
amendment rights of the SFAA is unfortunate, though hardly
surprising once one accepts the premise that Congress has a sub-
stantial interest in the USOC, and once one recognizes the grow-
ing efforts to expand trademark protection by invoking the dilu-
tion rationale of trademark law. However, in abandoning the
traditional confusion rationale of trademark law, the potential
for first amendment infringements expands. Section 110, as in-
terpreted by the Court, prohibited a substantial amount of con-
stitutionally protected speech, including the SFAA's use of the
word "Olympic."
The holding that the USOC was not a "government actor"
for fifth amendment purposes was also quite predictable in light
of the Burger Court's narrow approach to the state action doc-
trine. The Court, in its continuing efforts to free the private en-
terprise sector from the restraints of the fourteenth and fifth
amendments, even when the private entities are extensively in-
volved with the government, has subordinated the interests of
those dealing with these entities by denying them their fifth and
fourteenth amendment protections. The SFAA was denied its
fifth amendment right to equal protection under the law when
the USOC enforced its congressionally granted word-use author-
ity in a discriminatory manner.
The Court made it very clear that Congress had a substan-
tial interest in the USOC's activities. So substantial was Con-
gress' interest that the Court permitted the SFAA's first amend-
ment rights to be violated. Incredibly, at the same time, the
Court found Congress' interest and involvements with the USOC
to be so negligible that it refused to find the USOC was a "gov-
ernment actor" for fifth amendment purposes. Therefore, al-
though these concurrent holdings had the same end result,
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namely deference to the USOC at the expense of the SFAA's
individual liberties, they are irreconcilable.
Unfortunately, the SFAA's individual liberties will not be
the last to be subordinated to a so-called private enterprise that
has extensive government connections. For, with this decision,
the Supreme Court has dealt the final blow to the already termi-
nal state action doctrine.
Lois Nitti
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